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Abstract
This study attempts to carry out a comprehensive analysis of poverty, inequality and 
polarization trends using Cameroon household surveys collected before and during 
the Heavily Indebted Poor Countries (HIPC) process. The theoretical decomposition 
frameworks propelling the study are motivated mainly by the Shapley value. Empirical 
estimates are obtained from the software DAD 4.4 using both money-metric and 
child nutrition indicators, and poverty lines, with the monetary threshold derived non-
parametrically. Effects within-zones account for much of monetary poverty changes than 
effects between-zones. The findings that inter-zone effects contribute to alleviating rural 
poverty while aggravating urban poverty, suggests the potential for rural–urban migration 
to alleviate rural poverty. Changes in money-metric poverty and health deprivation 
sharply contrast each other. While health poverty deteriorated, income poverty retreated. 
This is an indication that economic growth may not necessarily engender significant 
reduction in all dimensions of well-being. Changes in health poverty are driven largely 
by effects of redistribution, whereas for income poverty the growth component seems 
to be more important. Both income and non-income dimensions highlight the dominant 
role of within-group components in accounting for inequality trends. However, while the 
between-group contributions to inequality are negligible in the health dimension, they 
are non-negligible in the income space. In terms of levels, polarization and inequality 
are more of an urban than a rural problem, yet inequality and polarization worsened 
only in rural areas in the period 1996–2001. As a whole, polarization indices do not 
give dissimilar trends from standard measures of inequality. The conflicting results 
from income and health well-being indicators are attributable to the observation that the 
economic rebound in Cameroon was preceded by fiscal austerity measures embedded 
in the Structural Adjustment Programmes that engendered a decline in the availability 
of public goods. Moreover, health indicators are slow-moving compared with income 
or expenditure, which does not include the quality of service received from social 
expenditures on health and nutrition. These results have implications for policy making: 
in terms of income deprivation, emphasis could be on growth-based labour-intensive 
policies that create opportunities for the rural poor to increase their incomes; and in 
terms of child health and perhaps general health, emphasis could be on redistribution 
of health infrastructure and personnel to increase outreach. 
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1.  Introduction 
W
ith the apparent failure of the first wave of Structural Adjustment Programmes   
(SAPs), most African countries, with support from donors, embarked on   
development policy reformulation giving priority to growth and poverty 
reduction. These objectives are systematically captured in Poverty Reduction Strategy 
Papers (PRSPs) indicating that governments and their development partners agree that 
adjustment efforts are likely to be unsustainable if the needs of the poor are ignored.1
After a period of sustained growth in Cameroon up to the middle of the 1980s, 
accomplishing an annual average growth of 7% over a 10-year period (Government of 
Cameroon, 2003), the situation deteriorated. From 1986 onwards the country suffered severe 
economic and social crisis. The crisis was blamed on poor macroeconomic performance 
occasioned in part by a downturn in world market prices of export commodities from 1986 
that exposed the structural deficiencies of the country to cope with global pressures, and 
by the overvaluation of the CFA franc (F) against the US dollar (1985 exchange rates) 
— a currency in which most of Cameroon’s exports are denominated (Baye, 2006a). The 
short-term effects of the ensuing deflationary policies designed from 1988 in search of 
macroeconomic stability are thought to have caused the deterioration of the well-being of 
Cameroonians, especially those at the lower half of the distribution of living standards. 
Economic indicators continued to deteriorate and the steady decline in incomes led to a 
40% fall in per capita consumption between 1985/86 and 1992/93. The external debt stock 
rose from less than one-third to more than three-quarters of the gross domestic product 
(GDP) between 1984/85 and 1992/93. Investment declined from 27% to less than 11% of 
GDP over the same period (Government of Cameroon, 2003). Cameroonian authorities 
tried to cope with the resulting budget deficits by reducing public expenditures — including 
a 60% cut in civil service wages in 1993, and cuts in producer prices of traditional exports 
in 1991 — but these measures did not stimulate growth. The authorities also tried to cope 
by more borrowing to finance budgetary shortfalls in the system. Unfortunately, debt 
servicing grew rapidly and started crowding out investments (Mbanga and Sikod, 2002). 
The provision of public goods and services declined markedly due to lack of investment 
and poor performance of state-owned enterprises. 
The government reduced basic health and education funding and this led to a major 
decline in health delivery systems and school enrolment (Khan and Noumba, 2001). 
Restructuring of state and semi-state enterprises, a freeze in increments and recruitment 
in the public service and staff redundancies caused a surge in unemployment, which 
affected women and young people disproportionately. The marketing of traditional export 
commodities was liberalized from 1992 to 1994, thus exposing farmers to wild swings 
in world market prices. These internal measures caused hardships for Cameroonians. 2  rE s E a r c h Pa P E r  207
However, political entrepreneurs, subjected to conditionalities of the donor community, 
judged these measures to be too slow to effect the much needed adjustment, and hence 
recourse was made to devaluation, which has both expenditure-reducing and expenditure-
switching components. 
Baye (2006a) notes that the adverse international environment, as reflected in the 
overvaluation of the CFAF against the dollar and the sagging world market prices of 
commodity exports in the late 1980s and early 1990s, and its implications for government 
revenue, production, consumption and relative prices, justified the 50% devaluation of the 
CFAF in January 1994. Being a centrepiece of the adjustment programme, the devaluation 
was intended to perform two functions: (1) reduce expenditure on imports, and (2) re-
allocate resources away from non-tradeable to tradeable commodities to prop up the 
global competitiveness of the economy. Subsequent to the 1994 devaluation of the CFAF, 
Cameroon achieved macroeconomic stability. Yet, rural incomes were slow to improve 
because much of the acreage under coffee and cocoa had been abandoned, in addition to 
the typically low short-run elasticities of supply of these commodities. 
Poverty alleviation, however, became a major policy concern in Cameroon following 
the achievement of macroeconomic stability occasioned by the devaluation. Concerns 
about poverty were strengthened in the 1990s as social considerations were gradually 
appended to the objectives of the initial SAPs. The acknowledgment of this in Cameroon 
can be traced to the time the Enhanced Structural Adjustment Facility (ESAF) (schedule 
for 1997–2000) was converted to the Poverty Reduction and Growth Facility (PRGF) in 
1999. This was further confirmed when the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and World 
Bank boards declared the eligibility of Cameroon for the enhanced Heavily Indebted Poor 
Countries (HIPC) initiative in May 2000 and when Cameroon subsequently reached the 
decision point in October 2000 and the completion point in April 2006. 
Following the relative success of its macroeconomic stabilization effort, Cameroon 
registered an annual average growth of around 4.5% for the period 1996–2001, despite the 
continuing decline of the oil sector. Over the same period, per capita income rose annually 
by about 2%. Social conditions, however, have deteriorated over the past two decades, 
as a result of the economic and social crisis, and growth has been neither durable enough 
nor sufficiently redistributive to reverse these trends. Consequently, by 2001 indicators 
of public health, education and access to basic services were still alarmingly low, and in 
some cases worse than they were in the 1980s (Government of Cameroon, 2003).
Cameroon started benefiting partially from debt relief in October 2000 and fully from 
April 2006. A good portion of the savings emanating from this initiative as agreed upon 
with development partners is being used in the social sector (education, health and basic 
infrastructure) as enshrined in the PRSP which was approved by the IMF and World 
Bank boards in July 2003. Government efforts are now geared towards achieving higher 
and sustainable growth, increasing the quality of public expenditure, enhancing the 
effectiveness of targeted policies and improving the overall state of governance. In this 
context, the government intends to significantly reduce poverty in the country in tandem 
with the Millennium Development Goals. To improve the coordination of these efforts, 
however, there is need for synchronized analysis of the components of aggregate poverty, 
inequality and polarization trends in the distribution of living standards triggered by past 
and ongoing reforms.Ex a c t  co n f i g u r a t i o n  o f  Po v E r t y , in E q u a l i t y  a n d  Po l a r i z a t i o n  tr E n d s  3
Research issues
O
verall poverty in Cameroon deepened in the period 1984–1996 and rural poverty   
remained more widespread, deeper and severer than urban poverty (Fambon et al., 
2005; Baye, 2006b). As observed in Baye and Amungwa (2002), the increasing level of 
poverty in rural communities induces many young people to migrate to cities and larger 
towns where they expect to find better conditions. However, they end up in a network of 
relatives and friends who initially support them against the worse hardships. Eventually, 
the youth face unemployment and underemployment, and are exposed to crime and anti-
social behaviour, causing insecurity problems for the authorities and for city dwellers. 
More generally, as argued in Baye and Fambon (2002), the economic crisis and 
the immediate effects of SAPs amalgamated and forced many Cameroonians to adopt 
coping mechanisms such as moonlighting, seeking for survival in the informal sector, 
occupational and geographical mobility, changing regional patterns of activities 
and productivity, and adopting “behavioural innovations” like corruption and other 
malpractices for survival. These adaptations are thought to have modified the pattern of 
most dimensions of well-being among households in the different regions and sectors 
of activity. 
However, subsequent to the 1994 devaluation of the CFAF and the satisfactory 
implementation of the first three-year (1997–2000) economic and financial programme 
supported by IMF and the World Bank, Cameroon improved its macroeconomic stability 
and realized sustained economic growth of 4.5% in the period 1996–2001. After fulfilling 
the conditions imposed by the donor community and successfully negotiating the HIPC 
process,2 the country is now benefiting substantially from debt relief. Huge financial 
resources are now available in the HIPC account to finance its growth and poverty 
alleviation programmes. Meanwhile, in the period of interim debt relief that was mainly 
focused on the social sectors (health, education and basic infrastructure), the incidence 
of poverty declined by 13.1 percentage points, retreating from 53.3% in 1996 to 40.2% 
in 2001 according to estimates of the National Institute of Statistics (2002). 
In the period 1984–2001, Cameroon witnessed all the possible phases of the business 
cycle: Economic prosperity (up to 1985); economic and social crisis (1986–1994); and 
renewed economic fortunes (from 1995). In such a context, a comprehensive inter-
temporal evaluation of the pattern and investigation of the relative importance of mobility 
between sectors and/or sector specific effects on measured poverty, inequality, and 
polarization trends are of interest to both analysts and political entrepreneurs, who want 
to better understand elements that inform the targeting of incentives and transfers. 
Informed knowledge on poverty, inequality and polarization trends by socioeconomic 
characteristics such as employment status, occupation, sector of activity, zone of residence 
and region of the country, though vital for public policy, is unfortunately still fragmented 
in Cameroon. Only a few studies tackle some aspects of inter-temporal monetary poverty 
changes (see National Institute of Statistics, 2002; Fambon et al., 2005; Baye, 2006a; 
Baye, 2006b). Very little (if any) is known about the exact contributions of within- and 
between-zone components of levels or changes in aggregate poverty or inequality using 
household survey data from 1984, 1996 and 2001. Confronting both money and non-
money metric indicators in a consolidated framework is yet to be realized in many African 4  rE s E a r c h Pa P E r  207
countries, including Cameroon. In addition, polarization trends, which are vital for a 
fuller configuration of the distribution of well-being, are still poorly perceived by both 
researchers and decision makers in Cameroon. Yet, such information is indispensable to 
complement other distributive measures, especially as growth and poverty eradication 
are becoming priorities. 
Before carrying out the decomposition exercises, however, we set poverty lines non-
parametrically using the traditional cost-of-basic-needs (CBN) method. Fambon et al. 
(2001) and Baye (2006a) use a blend of the food-energy-intake (FEI) and CBN methods 
using non-parametric techniques to compute poverty lines. The poverty lines derived in 
this way, however, are inconsistent as highlighted in Ravallion and Bidani (1994) and 
Bidani et al. (2001). The National Institute of Statistics (2002) uses the CBN method to 
compute food and overall poverty lines using data from the 2001 household consumption 
survey, but the procedure followed is not transparent. This study mitigates most of these 
shortcomings in setting poverty lines in Cameroon.
To better inform public debate in the aftermath of or during policy adjustments that 
engender distributional changes, it is necessary to measure the evolution of a wide range 
of distributive indexes of poverty, inequality, and polarization and their components, 
to assess the importance of factors explaining them. Some conventional decomposition 
techniques in distributive analysis do not yield exact meaningful components because 
residuals or interaction terms are included to ensure their identity. Baye (2006a) 
characterizes such interaction terms as constituting “black boxes”, which are of interest 
to both analysts and policy makers if attributed accordingly to meaningful components 
of the decomposition.
To bridge some of the gaps plaguing some conventional decomposition techniques, 
Shorrocks (1999) proposes a unified theoretical framework driven by the Shapley value 
(Shapley, 1953), which eliminates “black boxes” that remain unexplained in many 
conventional decomposition techniques.3 This paper uses the Shapley value framework 
to decompose distributive measures that do not exactly yield meaningful components 
when conventional methods are used.
On the basis of the foregoing research concerns, the following questions can be 
distilled: Does economic growth necessarily produce significant reduction in all 
dimensions of poverty? What is the relative importance of within- and between-group 
components of poverty and inequality trends? What is the relative importance of growth 
and redistribution effects of changes in indicators of well-being? Do trends in polarization 
tell dissimilar stories to trends in inequality in the distribution of living standards? These 
questions are reformulated into the objectives of this study.
Objectives 
T
he main objective of this study is to investigate the characteristics of trends in a set of   
distributive measures that capture poverty, inequality, and polarization and their 
contributing factors in the period 1984–2001 using Cameroon household surveys.
The specific objectives are: 
•  To set poverty lines using non-parametric procedures;
•  To assess the within- and between-zone contributions to changes in aggregate Ex a c t  co n f i g u r a t i o n  o f  Po v E r t y , in E q u a l i t y  a n d  Po l a r i z a t i o n  tr E n d s  5
poverty; 
•  To evaluate the means and distribution effects of changes in income and non-income 
well-being indicators; 
•  To decompose inequality trends into within-group and between-group components 
using both income and non-income well-being indicators; 
•  To examine shifts in polarization indexes and compare with inequality measures; 
and 
•  To derive policy implications on the basis of the analysis. 
The rest of this study is divided into four main sections. Section 2 outlines the 
methodologies, which include decomposition frameworks for poverty, inequality and 
polarization as well as well-being measures and procedures for setting poverty lines. 
Section 3 presents data and adjustments from household surveys. Section 4 analyses 
empirical results and Section 5 pools the various strands into concluding remarks.
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T
his section briefly outlines methods for: (1) sectoral decomposition of changes in   
monetary poverty; (2) growth and redistribution decomposition of changes across   
dimensions of well-being; (3) within and between subgroup decomposition 
of levels and changes in inequality across dimensions of well-being; (4) measuring 
polarization trends; and (5) setting poverty lines. The theoretical framework and some 
details of the decomposition are presented in Appendix 4.
Sectoral decomposition of changes in monetary poverty
T
he Pa class of poverty measures has the desirable property of subgroup consistency.   
The implication of this property is that the overall level of poverty would fall, ceteris 
paribus, whenever poverty decreases within some subgroups of the population and is 
unchanged outside those groups (Foster and Shorrocks, 1991; Balisacan, 1995). This 
class of poverty measures is additively decomposable in the sense that aggregate poverty 
level is simply a weighted average of subgroup poverty levels, the weights being their 
population shares. For example, for a policy change that increases the incomes of one   
group and reduces those of another group, one can work out the impact of the change 
on each group’s average poverty level and then use the groups’ respective population 
shares to estimate the new aggregate poverty level. 
The Pa class of poverty measures is used to identify the factors underlying the observed 
changes in aggregate poverty between two dates, t and t+n. The factors explored here 
are the intra and inter subgroup contributions to any observed changes in poverty. If fg 
and Pag represent the population share and poverty level of subgroup gÎG, the property 
of subgroup decomposability of the Pa class of poverty measures enables us to write 
the expression  . The aggregate change in poverty between period t 
and t+n yields:
  (1)
The goal here is to account for the overall change in poverty, DPa, in terms of changes 
in poverty within subgroups, DPag = Pag,t+n - Pag,t gÎG, and the population shifts between 
subgroups, Dfg = fg,t+n – fg,t gÎG. 
The Shapley value sectoral decomposition for aggregate poverty changes is given by 
Equations 2 and 3 for the within group and between group components respectively.4 
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  (2)
  (3)
Equation 1, explaining the overall change in poverty, can now be rewritten in terms of 
exactly two components: changes in poverty within-zone and between-zone population 
shift effects as: 
  (4)
In contrast with the standard sectoral decomposition suggested by Ravallion and Huppi 
(1991), there is no interaction term in the Shapley decomposition in Equation 4.
Decomposing changes in well-being into mean and 
distribution effects 
T
he decomposition of changes in well-being into means and distribution effects was   
first introduced by Datt and Ravallion (1992). The main setback of their approach 
is the presence of a non-vanishing residual. Kakwani (1997) developed an axiomatic 
approach that achieves an exact growth and redistribution decomposition, but it can 
only handle two factors. Shorrocks (1999) developed a more general framework for 
exact decomposition that can admit more than two factors using a Shapley value-based 
approach, which is considered a rationalization of the averaging procedure to eliminate 
the residual term (see Baye, 2006a).
The growth-redistribution components of any change in well-being (DPa) by the 
Shapley value, is given by Equations 5 and 6 respectively (see Shorrocks, 1999; Baye, 
2006a).
The Shapley growth component of DPga:
 
    (5)
The Shapley redistribution component of DPga:8  rE s E a r c h Pa P E r  207
    (6)
Equations 5 and 6 express the decomposition of well-being changes into growth and 
redistribution components respectively. 
Change in well-being in group g can now be expressed as the sum of the growth and 
redistribution components as:
   (7)
Framework for inequality measurement 
S
everal measures have been proposed in the literature for characterizing inequality in   
the distribution of living standards (Sen, 1973; Theil, 1979; Kakwani, 1980; Fields, 
1980; Shorrocks, 1984; Glewwe, 1986; Litchfield, 1999). According to these authors, any 
appropriate measure of inequality that can conveniently facilitate welfare analysis must 
lend itself to at least five axiomatic conditions: (1) the mean independence condition; (2) 
the population-size independence condition; (3) the Pigou-Dalton transfer sensitivity; 
(4) the symmetry condition; and (5) the decomposability condition. 
The S-Gini class of indexes 
The popularity and attractive properties of the Gini coefficient makes it an indispensable 
measure in any study of inequality. The Gini coefficient tends to satisfy axioms 1–4 
above, but will fail the decomposability condition if subgroups of the distribution of 
well-being overlap. According to Donaldson and Weymark (1980) and Duclos (2002), 
after ordering living standards in a Lorenz consistent manner, the class of S-Gini (or 
“single-parameter” Gini) inequality indexes can be shown to be equal to the covariance 
formula in Equation 8: 
  (8)
where Q(P) is the level of living standard below which we find a proportion P of the 
population. P Î [0, 1] is the proportion of individuals/households in the population who 
enjoy standards of living that are less than or equal to the quantile Q(P). r is a parameter 
of inequality aversion that determines our ethical concern for the deviation of quantiles Ex a c t  co n f i g u r a t i o n  o f  Po v E r t y , in E q u a l i t y  a n d  Po l a r i z a t i o n  tr E n d s  9
from the mean at various ranks in the population. The larger the value r, the more weight 
is given to the deviation of living standards from the mean, m, at the lower tail of the 
distribution. When r becomes very large, the index G(r) equals the proportional deviation 
from the mean of the lowest living standard. When r=1, the same weight is given to all 
deviations from the mean, which then makes the inequality index G(r=1) always equal 
to 0, regardless of the distribution of living standards under consideration.
The conventional Gini index is then obtained by letting r=2:
  (9)
which is just a proportion of the covariance between living standards and their ranks. 
An interesting property of the conventional Gini index is that it equals half the mean-
normalized average distance between all living standards. Thus, if the standard Gini 
index is found to be 0.3 the interpretation is that the average distance between the living 
standards of that distribution is of the order of 60% of the mean. The Gini coefficient 
for r=2 can be portrayed graphically as twice the area lying between the Lorenz curve 
and the 45° line divided by the total area in such a diagram (see Baye, 1998). The 
denominator ensures that this measure will vary between 0 (perfect equality) and 1 
(perfect inequality).
Subgroup decomposition of the Gini: The Shapley value approach
The Shapley value decomposition rule has been used to obtain exact decomposition of 
the Gini coefficient into between-group and within-group components that sum up to 
the total inequality with no residual (Araar, 2006). The application of the Shapley value 
involves two steps. The first step is to decompose total inequality into between-group and 
within-group contributions. The second step is to express global within-group contribution 
as a weighted sum of the within-group contributions by the different subgroups. Let us 
denote the within-group inequality by Wg and the between group inequality by Bg, so that 
total Gini index G(y) = v(Wg,Bg), expressed in terms of the characteristic function v. 
In the first step, we suppose that the two Shapley contributions that account for the 
overall Gini coefficient G(y) are within-group inequality component   and between-
group inequality component  , given by:  . The basic rules 
followed to compute the marginal contributions of each of these factors are:
(1) Eliminate the between-group inequality and compute the within-group inequality by 
using a vector of well-being where each household’s well-being has been multiplied 
by the ratio m/mk. This operation renders the average well-being of each group to 
equal m.
(2) Eliminate the within-group inequality and compute the between-group inequality, 
G(m1,…, mk), by using a vector of income where each household has the average 
income of its group, denoted by mk.
(3) Eliminate between- and within-group inequality simultaneously and each household 10 r E s E a r c h Pa P E r  207
remains with the average well-being. In this case, G(m) = 0.
The elimination order of factors following these rules is arbitrary and the arbitrariness 
is removed when the Shapley value approach is used. The Shapley value within-group 
and between-group contributions can be given as shown in Equations 10 and 11 
respectively.
 = 0.5[v(Wg,Bg)-v(Bg) + v(Wg) – 0] 
  = 0.5[G(y) – G(mk) + G(y(m/mk)) – G(m)]  (10)
 = v(Wg,Bg)-v(Wg) + v(Bg) – 0
  = 0.5[G(y) – G(y(m/mk)) + G(mk) – G(m)]  (11)
From the within-group contribution to total inequality expressed in Equation (10), the 
second step consists of decomposing global within-group inequality as a sum of within-
group inequality across groups. This decomposition is already generalized to include 
more than two groups and programmed in the software DAD 4.4. This procedure is also 
applicable to inter-temporal changes in Gini indexes of the distribution of well-being.
The generalized entropy class of inequality indexes
The generalized Entropy class of inequality indexes GE(q) (see Litchfield, 1999; Duclos, 
2002), expressed as in Equation 12, satisfies all the five axioms for an appropriate 
measure of inequality. 
  (12)
where n is the number of households in the sample; yi is the standard of living of the ith 
household; and m = (1/n)Syi is the mean standard of living. q is the parameter of inequality 
aversion, which represents the weight given to distances between incomes at different 
parts of the distribution, and can take any real value. The values of GE(q) range from 
0 to Î, with 0 representing an equal distribution (all standards of living identical) and 
higher values representing higher levels of inequality. For lower values of q, GE(q) is 
more sensitive to changes in the lower tail of the distribution, and for higher values of Ex a c t  co n f i g u r a t i o n  o f  Po v E r t y , in E q u a l i t y  a n d  Po l a r i z a t i o n  tr E n d s   11
q, GE(q) is more sensitive to changes that affect the upper tail. If q = 0, GE(q=0) gives 
the gap of the logarithmic mean; if q = 1, GE(q=1) gives Theil’s (1979) inequality index 
and if q = 2, GE(q=2) gives half of the squared coefficient of variation.5
Decomposition of the generalized entropy class of indexes by subgroup
If we assume that the population can be broken down into G mutually exclusive groups 
(g = 1, 2, …,G), the generalized entropy class of inequality indexes can be decomposed 
to yield (Cowell and Jenkins, 1995; Duclos, 2002): 
  (13)
where   is the proportion of the population in group g; mg is the average living 
standard of group g; and GE(g;q) is inequality within group g. The terms GE(g;q > 0) 
are weighted by the product of population share and income share of group g, but the 
terms GE(g;q = 0) are strictly population-weighted. The first term on the right-hand-side 
of Equation 13 may be interpreted as the weighted sum of within-group inequalities in 
the distribution of living standards. The second term is the total population inequality 
when each household in group g is given the mean living standard mg of its group (that 
is, when within-group inequality has been eliminated). It can thus be interpreted as the 
contribution of between-group inequalities to total inequality.
Framework for polarization analysis
D
ebate over the possible differences between inequality and polarization has been   
attracting interest among researchers since the 1990s (Esteban and Ray, 1994; 
Wolfson, 1994, 1997; Wang and Tsui, 2000; Zhang and Kanbur, 2001; Rodriguez and 
Salas, 2003; Duclos et al. 2004a). These concepts have been argued to be capturing 
different features of a distribution, for example, phenomena such as “the disappearing 
middle class” or “clustering around extremes” that is likely to be taking place in highly 
corrupt or capitalist societies appears to be hardly captured by standard measures of 
inequality such as the Gini coefficient or the generalized entropy class. Yet, components 
of these measures may be arranged to capture aspects of polarization as suggested by 
Zhang and Kanbur (2001). 
Polarization indices have been suggested which seek evidence for clustering in 
the distribution of well-being at the lower and upper ends. Polarization, thus, captures 
the extent to which the population is becoming clustered, such that within each 
cluster members are very similar, but between clusters members are very different in 
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inequality measures with those of polarization measures that have been suggested in 
the literature.
Typically, an inequality index measures the overall spread of the distribution of living 
standards. It emphasizes the deviation from the global mean, ignoring clustering around 
local means, an aspect that polarization measures attempt to capture. An important 
motivation underlying inequality is the “Pigou-Dalton axiom” which stipulates that any 
transfer from rich to poor, other things remaining the same, always decreases inequality. 
Polarization naturally places more emphasis on “clustering” or “the disappearing 
middle-class”, which are phenomena that can respect or fail to respect the Pigou-Dalton 
axiom. 
The concept of polarization can therefore run counter to the Pigou-Dalton axiom that 
underlies conventional inequality measures. For example, distribution of well-being from 
the middle-class to those at the lower end of the distribution may reduce inequality but 
society may become more polarized. A more polarized distribution is one that is more 
spread-out from the middle, so that there are fewer households with mid-level standards 
of living (Wolfson, 1994; Rodriguez, 2004). Therefore, polarization measures can be used 
to complement other measures of the distribution of living standards, notably poverty, 
inequality, and social welfare. To capture the concept of polarization, we discuss measures 
proposed by Wolfson (1994) and Duclos et al. (2004b).
Duclos-Esteban-Ray (2004) class of polarization indexes 
In Esteban and Ray (1994) and Duclos et al. (2004b), polarization is viewed as the sum of 
antagonisms between individuals that belong to different groups. Antagonism is the joint 
result of inter-group alienation, combined with the sense of identification within groups. 
The Duclos-Esteban-Ray (2004) index, builds on the Esteban and Ray (1994) index by 
introducing continuity and eliminating the ad hoc nature of bunching the relevant groups. 
Yet, both are motivated by the identification-alienation framework. Alienation relates 
in the accentuation of polarization by between-group heterogeneity and identification 
relates to accentuation of polarization by within-group homogeneity. 
The Duclos-Esteban-Ray index, denoted by POLDER, is therefore built on the basis of 
the two behavioural functions (“identification” and “alienation”). Identification is depicted 
as an increasing function of the number of households in the same well-being class. For 
any household, the more the number of households that have the same well-being level, 
the more sense of identification members feel. The alienation function characterizes the 
antagonism caused by differences in well-being. A household feels alienated from others 
that are “far away” from it in terms of well-being. 
Let yi be the well-being of each household in group i, yk the corresponding well-being 
of each household in group k, and pi the size of group i and pk the size of group k. If the 
identification function is represented by 
Î Îi , and the alienation function by |yi – yk|, then 
one way of capturing polarization is to use the product of these two for each household, 
which reflects the antagonism felt by each individual of group i with respect to each 
member of group k, and the sum across all households to give:Ex a c t  co n f i g u r a t i o n  o f  Po v E r t y , in E q u a l i t y  a n d  Po l a r i z a t i o n  tr E n d s   13
  (14)
where K is the number of groups; and A is a normalization scalar. Indeed, Duclos et al. 
(2004b) derive this specific form, which is similar to that of Esteban and Ray (1994), as 
satisfying four reasonable axioms, and they show further that to satisfy these axioms, 
the “degree of polarization” sensitivity parameter aÎ [0.25, 1].6 The larger the parameter 
a, the greater is the deviation of the POLDER index from the standard Gini coefficient 
and vice versa. One can verify that POLDER is equal to the Gini coefficient if a is set to 
0. Furthermore, when pi =1, the POLDER index becomes a scalar transformation of the 
Gini. The Gini coefficient is therefore a special case of the POLDER class of polarization 
indexes. 
Wolfson (1994) polarization index
The Wolfson (1994) index of bipolarization, denoted by POLW, was originally proposed 
for a population divided into two groups by the median value. POLW is derived from the 
Lorenz curve. It is twice the area between the Lorenz curve and the tangent line at the 
median point. It can be written as: 
  (15)
where Tm = 0.5-L(0.5) is the trapezoid area delimitated by the diagonal line and the 
tangent to the Lorenz curve (L) at the 50th population percentile. This trapezoid area 
is also equal to the vertical distance between the 45-degree line and the Lorenz curve 
at the median percentile, L(0.5), which denotes the well-being share of the bottom half 
of the population; m is the median income; m is the mean income; m* is the distribution 
corrected mean well-being, which is given by m(1-Gini); and mL is the mean well-being of 
the bottom half of the population. Maximum polarization occurs when half the population 
has zero well-being and the other half has twice the mean. Wolfson (1994) shows that 
like the Gini index, this index can be made to lie between 0 and 1. This index handles 
polarization, inequality and social welfare in the same framework. 
The Wolfson index of polarization has been reformulated in terms of the between-
group Gini coefficient and the within-group Gini coefficient computed for groups 
separated by the median value as follows (see, Rodriguez and Salas, 2003; Prieto et 
al., 2004):
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where m is the median; m is the mean; GW the within-group Gini; and GB the between-
group Gini. In this context, polarization and inequality are explicitly represented within 
the same framework, with subtraction and addition of the within-group dispersion 
corresponding to polarization and inequality respectively. In this framework, progressive 
income transfers between-groups reduce both inequality and polarization whereas 
progressive transfers within groups reduce inequality but may increase polarization.
As noted in Rodriguez (2004), one of the advantages of these reformulations is that 
a link is established between the Wolfson concept of polarization and the polarization 
model of Esteban and Ray (1994) and Duclos et al. (2004b), which are motivated by 
the identification-alienation framework. Hence, GB represents feelings of alienation 
between dissimilar individuals and GW represents feelings of identification between 
similar individuals.
Well-being measures and poverty lines 
Indicators of well-being 
Following the work by Sen (1979, 1985, 1987), most poverty analysts accept, at least 
in theory, that poverty is a multidimensional phenomenon. There is no doubt that low 
incomes are significantly instrumental in gauging poverty status. Yet, deprivation with 
respect to a variety of other basic capabilities or functionings (health, literacy, security, 
political voice, etc.) should complement standard measures of income or expenditures to 
fully tease out the ramifications of poverty (see Sen, 1979, 1985, 1987). In addition, there 
is growing concern among policy makers and stakeholders that non-income measures 
of well-being such as infant mortality and children’s nutritional status may not improve 
over time even when incomes increase substantially (Sahn and Younger, 2005).
As in Sahn and Younger (2005), this study used as measures of well-being both 
household expenditures per adult equivalent, the standard variable, and children’s 
standardized heights (their height-for-age z-scores), a good measure of young children’s 
nutrition and overall health status. In this context, medical and public health research 
show that children’s height is a good and objective indicator of their general health 
status, providing an observable measure of one of Sen’s basic functionings (Cole and 
Parkin, 1977; Mosley and Chen, 1984; WHO, 1995). Thus, a good measure of the 
extent of children’s health deprivation is the deviation of the distribution of heights in 
a population from the distribution for a reference population of healthy children who 
reach their genetic potential (WHO, 1983; WHO, 1995).
Moreover, economic literature modelling health status in developing countries 
typically uses children’s height as its dependent variable (Strauss and Thomas, 1995). 
The main determinants of the distribution of children’s height in a population are the 
accumulation of episodes of inadequate nutrient intake, disease and deprivation that 
result in stunted growth (Martorell et al., 1975). Most analyses of children’s height 
are limited to young children because the distributions of heights of healthy children 
among populations are strictly independent of race and ethnic composition (Habicht et 
al., 1974). 
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measure of well-being (Sahn and Younger, 2005). The standard measure of inadequate 
nutrition, stunting (an excessively low height conditional on age and gender), is a 
function of the share of observations below a given threshold, just like the income poverty 
headcount. This threshold is interpreted as a “height poverty line.” Any movement in 
the lower end of the height distribution to the right will show a reduction in stunting, 
which is interpreted as “height poverty”. Moreover, since stunting reflects cumulative 
nutritional and health deprivation, it is likely to persist despite higher incomes (Gaiha 
and Kulkarni, 2005). Thus, height-for-age is an indicator of long-term nutritional status 
because it measures both current and past nutritional status.
The standard procedure for analysing anthropometric data, such as height, is to 
transform it into age and gender standardized z-scores, or standard deviation scores, to 
assess the extent to which a child is above or below the median of the distribution of 
healthy children. The height-for-age indicator can therefore be used to assess chronic 
under-nutrition in children. Prolonged under-nutrition causes retardation of growth in 
both height and weight to a roughly comparable degree. Height gain is most affected 
by long-standing environmental and socioeconomic factors; it reflects snowballing 
socioeconomic conditions the children and their parents have witnessed. 
The children’s height-for-age z-score (HAZ) typically measures how a child’s height 
compares to the median of the World Health Organization (WHO) reference sample of 
healthy children (WHO, 1983) or some other reference class. In particular, the z-scores 
standardize a child’s height by age and gender as follows:
  (17)
where xik is height of a specific child i in a group k, which is defined by age and gender; xk  
is the median height of children in a healthy and well-nourished reference population of 
the same age and gender; and sk is the standard deviation from the mean of the indicator 
for children within the same group in the reference population. Thus, the z-score measures 
the number of standard deviations that a child’s height is above or below the median for 
a reference population of healthy children of the same age and gender. 
The limiting distribution of the z-score is standard normal, so a child who is below 
–2 z-scores has only a very low probability of being of normal height. Thus, WHO 
(1983) takes –2 z-scores to be the height poverty line, below which a child is judged to 
be stunted (or height poor).7 Since z-scores will typically be negative for height poor 
children, they will not be quite appropriate in defining most distributive statistics. In 
this case, we could have used the percentiles routinely computed alongside the z-scores, 
but since our analysis is also inter-temporal in nature, the problem of the appropriate 
health poverty line to use in terms of percentiles arises. Sahn (2003) proposes the use 
of “standardized heights” to get round the problem. 
To obtain the “standardized height”, each child’s height is transformed to the height 
for a reference age and gender, say 24-month old girls. This age is within the period that 
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This way, child height is not only standardized but also harmonized inter-temporally, 
and an identical health poverty line in terms of percentiles is obtainable using the 1996 
and 2001 data sets.
The standardized height measure is constructed such that a child’s position in the 
distribution, in terms of percentiles, is the same for actual height in the actual age/
gender group and the transformed height in the reference group WHO distribution. 
More explicitly:
  (18)
where F is the distribution function of heights in the WHO population for age/gender 
group defined by a (age) and g (gender); h is the actual height;  24 = a  months;  g = 
gender; and H is standardized height. 
Measures of well-being
In the literature on poverty analysis, an appropriate poverty measure must reflect three 
basic elements: the incidence (or prevalence) of poverty, as measured by the number in 
the total population living below the poverty line; the intensity (or depth) of poverty, 
reflecting the extent to which the well-being of the poor lies below the poverty line; 
and the degree of inequality among the poor8 (World Bank, 1990). If a poverty index is 
needed to assess the effects of policy adjustments, then the index must be decomposable 
across sectors (Kanbur, 1987) or subgroup decomposable (World Bank, 1990). A class 
of poverty indexes that meets the aforementioned requirements in a stepwise fashion is 
the one suggested by Foster et al. (1984). The Foster-Greer-Thorbecke (FGT) class of 
poverty indexes takes the form:
  (19)
     
where yi is the well-being measure for those individuals below the poverty line, and zero 
is the measure for those above; Z is the poverty line; n the total population; and q the 
number of poor people. The parameter a takes the value of 0 for the headcount index 
(P0), 1 for the poverty gap (P1) and 2 for the squared poverty gap (P2). 
The P0 measure is appealing because it is easily interpreted. However, it has clear 
limitations because it is entirely insensitive to the degree of poverty. Indeed, a transfer of 
income from a very poor person to someone just below the poverty line would actually 
reduce the incidence of poverty if the recipient of the transfer crosses the poverty line 
as a result of the transfer, even though the poorer person is worse off than before. The P1 
measure addresses this shortcoming to an extent because it reflects the distances between 
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is attractive from a policy perspective because Z.P1 gives an indication of the potential 
minimum average resources that could be deployed to lift an individual out of deprivation 
assuming perfect targeting. The P2 measure differs in that it applies an increasing weight 
to distances below the poverty line, which makes it particularly sensitive to the severity 
of poverty. Although difficult to interpret, it is useful in poverty comparisons. 
Setting monetary poverty lines in Cameroon using CHCS 2001 
data
The two traditional approaches for setting absolute poverty lines are the CBN and FEI 
methods.9 Both methods anchor the definition of basic needs to food energy requirements. 
In this study, we compute the unit cost per calorie-intake and upgrade it to meet some 
recommended minimum level of calorie-intake to obtain the food poverty line. To obtain 
the overall poverty line, we use two hybrids of the CBN method — one that evaluates 
the non-food essential expenditures per adult equivalent and the other that estimates a 
non-parametric regression of pseudo total expenditures on food expenditures. 
Food poverty line
As with the spatial harmonization of expenditure in each of the three surveys, Yaoundé 
was chosen as the reference region in the process of computing poverty lines using the 
2001 survey as the base. About 99% of the 170 food items captured in the Cameroon 
Households Consumption Survey (CHCS) 2001 and their corresponding calorie contents 
per 100g obtained from another source (see Fambon et al., 2001) were employed in the 
estimation of the food poverty line. The exercise was painstaking because it involved 
the incorporation of calories per 100g item by item in the product file.10 Since both 
expenditure and quantities were captured by the survey, information on calories was 
then used to calculate the amount of calories per food product purchased. In cases where 
quantities of food items were expressed in traditional measurement units, price data 
per kilogram collected in Yaoundé in 2001 was used alongside the household survey. 
In these cases, expenditure on the food items was divided by the price per kilogram to 
estimate quantities purchased before evaluating their calorie contents.11 Annual calories 
per food item were then aggregated per household and transferred to the household file 
of CHCS 2001. 
We then eliminated the influence of outliers in favour of the typical expenditure 
patterns of households in the reference region. Household total expenditures in Yaoundé 
were arranged into deciles and the first and last three deciles were eliminated because 
they were likely to exhibit atypical expenditure patterns. The chosen group of households 
was, therefore, those who found themselves between the first and seventh deciles in 
terms of total expenditures per adult equivalent. Aggregate food expenditure and the 
corresponding aggregate calorie-intake of the reference group of households were 
computed. The cost per calorie-intake was then derived by dividing aggregate food 
expenditure by aggregate calorie-intake. The food poverty line is obtained by multiplying 
the unit cost of calorie-intake by the recommended minimum daily nutritional anchor 
for an adult to ensure normal activity [2,400kcal per day for Cameroon, according to the 
Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO) of the United Nations]. This level of calories 18 r E s E a r c h Pa P E r  207
was chosen to remain consistent with the equivalent scale used to normalize household 
expenditures. More compactly:
  (20)
where, UCCI is the unit cost of calorie-intake of the reference group; j = 1, …, m are 
households in the reference group; FE is food expenditure; and CI is calorie-intake.
ZF=RMDA*UCCI  (21)
where ZF is the food poverty line per adult equivalent per day; and RMDA is the 
recommended minimum daily allowance in terms of energy for an adult to carry out 
normal activity.
Overall poverty lines
The overall poverty line is obtained by scaling up the food poverty line with allowances 
for non-food basic necessities. The non-food basic necessities taken into consideration 
were clothing and footwear, health, education and imputed rents. The two hybrids of 
the CBN approach used in this study can be labelled: (1) the adult equivalent non-food 
essential expenditure method; and (2) the non-parametric regression method.
The adult equivalent non-food essential expenditure method
This method uses expenditure on non-food basic necessities of the reference households 
to derive the non-food poverty line per adult equivalent, which is then added to the food 
poverty line to obtain an overall poverty line. The sum of the expenditure on non-food 
basic necessities of the reference group of households is divided by the corresponding 
sum of adult equivalent household sizes, to obtain the non-food poverty line per adult 
equivalent. More compactly:
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where, ZNF is the non-food poverty line per adult equivalent; j = 1, …, m are households 
in the reference group; NFEE is non-food essential expenditure; and AEHS is the adult 
equivalent household size. The overall poverty line is given by the sum of the food 
poverty line and the non-food poverty line (Zu = ZF + ZNF).
The non-parametric regression method
The study also used a “non-parametric” regression of the pseudo total expenditures on 
food expenditures following the logic of the parametric regression proposed by Ravallion 
(1992), Ravallion and Bidani (1994) and Ravallion (1998) to derive non-food components 
of the overall poverty line. The pseudo total expenditures are obtained by taking the sum 
of food and the non-food essential expenditures per adult equivalent. After computing 
the food poverty line as proposed above, the second stage involves estimating the total 
expenditures of those whose food expenditures equal the food poverty line using a non-
parametric regression method. 
The advantages of a non-parametric regression over a parametric one are that: (1) they 
do not impose a priori functional forms; and (2) the procedure applies a local weighting 
process that attributes smaller weights as the absolute gaps between individual food 
expenditure and the food poverty line increase. The results obtained by this method 
are therefore less affected by the presence of outliers in the data and thus do not suffer 
significantly from specification bias that originates from a “wrong” functional form. 
The non-parametric regression is performed using DAD4.4: Software for Distributive 
Analyses.12 We use the Nadaraya-Watson estimator, an option provided in DAD4.4. The 
Nadaraya-Watson non-parametric technique estimates regression functions based on 
data (Xi, Yi). The equation produces an estimate for Y at any requested value of X (not 
necessary the ones in the data), using as input (1) the data set (Xi, Yi), and (2) a kernel 
function describing the weights to be put on values in the data set near the requested 
X-value in estimating Y (see Nadaraya, 1964; Watson, 1964). 
After generating estimates for Y and fitting the regression line on X, an amount equal 
to the food poverty line may be projected from the X-axis to intersect the estimated 
regression line. The corresponding point on the Y-axis defines the overall poverty line 
denoted by Zu. The non-food component here is given by the difference between Zu and 
ZF. This is hypothetically illustrated in Figure 1.
Figure 1: Graphical illustration of non-parametric regression to obtain Zu20 r E s E a r c h Pa P E r  207
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and adjustments
T
his study is based on three household surveys: The 1984 Budgetary and   
Consumption  Survey (BCS) (DSCN, 1984), September 1983 to September 1984;   
the 1996 Cameroon Households Consumption Survey (CHCS I) (DSCN, 1996 
) February to April 1996; and the 2001 Cameroon Households Consumption Survey 
(CHCS II, 2001), September to December 2001, carried out by the National Institute of 
Statistics (2003). 
These snapshots represent points before, during and after SAPs in which household 
surveys are available. These surveys are different in a number of respects. The first 
is the duration — one year for the first survey; three months for the second; and four 
months for the third. The CHCS II covered all 10 regions of Cameroon. It was conducted 
in both urban and rural areas using a sample of 12,000 households, of which 10,992 
were actually visited. In all, data were collected for 22 strata, 10 rural and 12 urban. In 
particular, Yaoundé and Douala were considered as separate strata, then each of the 10 
regions was divided into two strata — one rural and one urban. In contrast, for CHCS I 
the country was divided into six strata (Yaoundé, Douala, Other Towns, Forests, High 
Plateaus and Savannah) and the sample size was 1,800 households, of which 1,731 were 
actually interviewed. The sample size was 5,474 households for BCS. The strategy was 
to adjust stratification in the 1984 and 2001 survey data to approximate the nomenclature 
of the 1996 household survey. There is no doubt that the adjustments made in Appendix 
1 are not 100% comparable, but they appear to be the most reasonable rearrangement. 
The sampling frames of both CHCS I and CHCS II are based on the 1987 general 
population and housing census augmented to correct for its age, while the 1984 BCS 
was based on the 1976 general population and housing census (GPHC). They are similar 
in: (1) the partitioning of the various regions, in the sense that the 1984 and the 2001 
surveys could easily be regrouped to mimic the structure of the 1996 survey; and (2) the 
sampling techniques used. To select households in semi-urban and rural areas in the three 
surveys, a three-stage sampling frame was adopted following the sequence city-area-
household. For the political and economic capitals (Yaoundé and Douala), a two-stage 
stratified probabilistic sampling was carried out to select households. 
The recall period in the 1984 and 1996 surveys was seven days for both rural and 
urban areas. The National Institute of Statistics (2002) adjusted the 2001 survey data to 
reflect the same seven-day recall period for rural and urban areas by using a multiplicative 
correction factor to adjust for declarations made by rural households. 
The welfare indicator used is expenditure per adult equivalent and standardized heights 
proxy for height-for-age z-scores, which capture child health. Since the composition 
of households by age was captured by the surveys, we followed previous studies in 
Cameroon to adopt a hybrid of the Oxford Equivalent Scale by attributing adult equivalent 
scales of 0.5 for household members aged below 15 and 1 for those aged 15 and above. 
This adult equivalent scale is consistent with the 2,400kcal per adult per day required 
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to exercise normal activity.
Spatial harmonization
T
here were price differences for the same commodity from region to region due to   
transport costs. Typically, food products were less expensive in rural than in urban 
areas, whereas manufactures tended to be more expensive in rural than urban areas. In 
this regard, CFAF100 in Yaoundé is not worth as much as CFAF100 in Vekovi (in the 
Northwest Region). To account for inherent price differences, Yaoundé was chosen as the 
reference region, and a purchasing power parity spatial price index was used to deflate 
household expenditure per adult equivalent per day in the different regions to render 
prices comparable with those in Yaoundé. The implicit assumption is that the structure 
of regional price differences has not changed significantly in the period 1984–2001.
The purchasing power parity index was computed by National Institute of Statistics 
from the price component of the CHCS II data. In the exercise, prices were collected on 
a national basket of about 150 products present in the different regions of the country for 
both urban and rural areas. In particular, Apart from Yaoundé and Douala, price indexes 
were computed for urban and rural areas for the 10 regions of Cameroon. Applying the 
2001 regional price indexes for the 1996 survey is a straightforward exercise since in 
both years Cameroon already had 10 regions. In 1984, Cameroon had only seven regions. 
The three northern regions were called the Grand North Region and the present Centre 
and South regions were simply the Centre-South Region. Simple arithmetic averages 
for urban and rural areas were used for localities in the Grand North and Centre-South 
regions in the 1984 survey data, mutatis mutandis.
Yaoundé was chosen as the reference region because of the representativeness of the 
chosen products and availability of reliable price data in this city. In the computation, 
a price index of 0.84 implies that the basket of goods that cost CFAF1,000 in Yaoundé 




he 1984 and 1996 total expenditures were scaled up, employing consumer price   
indexes, to express them in terms of 2001 prices to enable us use the poverty line 
computed from the 2001 survey for the three periods (see Appendix 3). For all practical 
purposes, these surveys are considered suitable for this study. 
Table 1:  Descriptive statistics of child health measures and the three harmonized 
household survey data 
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    percentiles/Height for   per adult equivalent 
    age z-scores  per day
  1996  2001  1984  1996  2001
Yaoundé  Mean  63.35  -0.82  24.36  -0.04  3,083.9  1,368.0  1,714.8
  Observations  143  143  184  184  652  363  1,095
  Std. deviation  42.59  1.55  35.20  2.82  5,070.0  1,444.5  2,006.6
  Median  91.83  -0.77  2.15  -0.02  2,009.0  975.5  1,175.5
Douala  Mean  65.69  -1.00  30.20  0.19  2,664.7  1,606.6  1,623.7
  Observations  117  117  117  117  676  382  1,118
  Std. deviation  42.87  1.60  37.16  2.83  2,642.0  1,581.0  2,660.3
  Median  95.56  -0.91  8.07  0.09  1,859.0  1,083.1  1,043.2
Other   Mean  55.16  -1.42  15.02  -.69  1,343.0  1,249.8  1,133.7
  towns  Observations  168  168  473  473  1106  358  2,762
  Std. deviation  45.10  1.88  26.84  2.67  1,900.0  1,514.0  1,051.8
  Median  67.98  -1.48  0.40  -0.95  907.1  963.2  879.5
Rural   Mean  62.73  -1.10  15.94  -0.93  892.0  534.4  866.4
  Forest  Observations  100  100  322  322  592  210  1,646
  Std. deviation  43.37  1.47  28.84  2.67  721.8  377.4  703.5
  Median  91.83  -1.15  .15  -0.99  707.0  436.8  699.7
Rural   Mean  61.13  -1.82  14.32  -0.94  780.3  683.8  834.9
  Highlands Observations  156  156  397  397  1,284  209  2,321
  Std. deviation  44.38  1.78  27.06  2.69  872.5  568.1  701.2
  Median  95.56  -1.76  0.40  -1.26  605.9  469.4  646.2
Rural   Mean  51.64  -1.61  13.09  -1.09  719.6  615.9  730.3
  Savannah Observations  113  113  392  392  939  209  2,050
  Std. deviation  45.15  1.53  25.04  2.74  599.0  560.8  539.7
  Median  67.98  -1.66  .15  -1.23  575.9  469.1  573.8
National  Mean  59.79  -1.31  16.48  -0.75  1,429.4  1,121.7  1,063.1
  Observations  797  797  1885  1885  5,249  1,731  10,992
  Std. deviation  44.10  1.70  28.87  2.73  2,433.0  1,310.7  1,320.3
  Median  91.83 -1,27  0,40  -0.99  870.9  749.5  766.7
Source: Computed by author from the three Cameroon household surveys.
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T
his section reports the empirical results related to: (1) the descriptive statistics; (2)   
the setting of poverty lines using non-parametric procedures; (3) the within- and   
between-zone contributions to changes in aggregate poverty; (4) the mean and 
distribution effects of changes in income and non-income well-being indicators; (5) the 
decomposition of inequality trends into within- and between-group components using 
both income and non-income well-being indicators; and (6) shifts in polarization indices 
compared with inequality measures.
Descriptive statistics of the harmonized household 
survey data
A
s shown in Table 1, the medians of both real food and total expenditures at both   
national and regional levels declined from 1984 to 1996 before climbing to levels in 
2001 that remain inferior to those in 1984. The global indication using the median is that 
poverty worsened before getting better over the period 1984–2001. The means of both 
real food and total expenditures for rural areas exhibited a similar tendency. For urban 
areas, as well as nationally, means declined over the entire period under study. The statistic 
that reflects the behaviour of poverty indexes is the median of real expenditures.
Estimates of poverty lines
Monetary dimension: Food and overall poverty lines
As shown in Table 2, the average price per 100kcal was about CFAF9.23 in Yaoundé in 
2001. With a daily minimum calorie-intake of 2,400kcal per adult, we obtained a food 
poverty line of CFAF221.52 per adult equivalent per day. The non-food poverty line 
was CFAF292.16 using the adult equivalent non-food essential expenditure method, 
which scales up the food poverty line to yield an overall poverty line of CFAF513.68 
per adult equivalent per day. This poverty line is comparable with the overall poverty 
line of CFAF509.41 per adult equivalent per day generated using the non-parametric 
regression technique (Table 2 and Figure 2).14 
When the entire distribution was used (last column of Table 2), the average price 
per 100kcal was CFAF10.82; the food poverty line was fixed at CFAF259.68 per adult 
equivalent per day. Using the adult equivalent non-food essential expenditure method 
we obtained a non-food poverty line of CFAF460.32 per adult equivalent per day and 
an overall poverty line of CFAF720 per adult equivalent per day. The corresponding 
non-parametric regression generated an overall poverty line of CFAF549.20 per adult 
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equivalent per day in Yaoundé. However, to eliminate the effects of outliers from the 
food poverty line, we are inclined to prefer the food poverty line computed when the first 
and last three deciles were excluded. Following the perceived conceptual advantages 
of the non-parametric regression technique, we preferred to use the overall poverty line 
(Zu=509.41) in subsequent monetary poverty analyses. 
Table 2: Food and overall poverty lines for the reference region (Yaoundé)
Variables  Estimates
	 Excluding	first		 Including	the
  and last    entire 
  three deciles  distribution
For food poverty line  
Sum of annual food expenditures of households (FE)  482,483,211  933,414,953
Sum of annual kilocalorie-intake by households (CI)  5,229,911,249  8,625,826,238
Unit cost of calorie-intake (UCCI) (in CFAF per kcal)  0.0923  0.1082
Recommended daily allowance (RDA) (in kcal)  2,400  2,400
Food Poverty Line (ZF)  221.52  259.68
For overall poverty line  
The adult equivalent non-food essential expenditure method   
Sum of annual non-food essential expenditures (NFEE)  294,906,694  744,730,485
Sum of adult equivalent household sizes (AEHS)  2,765.5  4,432.5
Non-food poverty line (ZNF)  292.16  460.32
Overall poverty line (Zu)  513.68  720.0
Non-parametric regression method   
For the restricted sample, when ZF= 221.52Î]220, 
230[,  ZuÎ]507.86, 518.07[  509.405  549.20
For the full sample, when ZF= 259.68Î]250, 260[ ,    (19.731)  (18.646)
ZuÎ]538.88, 549.5[   
Overall poverty line (Zu)
Source: Computed by author from CHCS 2001 survey data.Notes: Number of observations used to compute 
the food and non-food poverty lines is 658 after eliminating the first and last three deciles in terms of total 
expenditures per adult equivalent. Number of observations in the non-parametric regression is 1,095 
households. Poverty lines are expressed in CFAF per adult equivalent per day. The figures in parentheses 
are standard errors. 
The incidence of poverty in 1996 and 2001 at the national level was 56.2% and 
40.7% respectively using Zu=509.41 (Table 3). These results show that the prevalence 
of poverty retreated by some 15.5 percentage point within five years. Disaggregating 
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Figure 2: Non-parametric regression of total expenditure on food expenditure for 
Yaoundé (2001)
Source: Computed by author from CHCS 2001 survey data.
Table 3: Regional incidence of poverty in Cameroon, 1996 and 2001  
  Overall poverty lines (Zu) = 509.41
  1996  2001
Region  Pop.   P0  ACi  RCi  Pop.   P0  ACi  Pop. 
  share        share      share
Yaoundé  0.071   0.301   0.021   0.038   0.087   0.154   0.013   0.087 
   (0.013)   (0.049)   (0.006)   (0.012)   (0.006)   (0.018)   ( 0 . 0 0 2 )    
(0.006)
Douala   0.098   0.249   0.024   0.043   0.097   0.163   0.016   0.097 
   (0.017)   (0.058)   (0.008)   (0.014)   (0.006)   (0.014)   ( 0 . 0 0 2 )    
(0.006)
Other Towns  0.129   0.258   0.033   0.059   0.164   0.263   0.043   0.164 
   (0.034)   (0.040)   (0.010)   (0.020)   (0.017)   (0.019)   ( 0 . 0 0 5 )    
(0.017)
Rural Forest  0.182   0.729   0.132   0.235   0.145   0.453   0.066   0.145 
   (0.051)   (0.039)   (0.039)   (0.068)   (0.022)   (0.034)   ( 0 . 0 1 3 )    
(0.022)
Rural Highlands  0.279   0.694   0.194   0.344   0.262   0.511   0.134   0.262 Ex a c t  co n f i g u r a t i o n  o f  Po v E r t y , in E q u a l i t y  a n d  Po l a r i z a t i o n  tr E n d s   27
   (0.066)   (0.055)   (0.050)   (0.082)   (0.028)   (0.025)   ( 0 . 0 1 7 )    
(0.028)
Continued next page
Table 3 Continued 
  Overall poverty lines (Zu) = 509.41
  1996  2001
Region  Pop.   P0  ACi  RCi  Pop.   P0  ACi  Pop. 
  share        share      share
Rural Savannah  0.242   0.650   0.158   0.280   0.245   0.552   0.135   0.245 
   (0.058)   (0.087)   (0.043)   (0.073)   (0.028)   (0.035)   ( 0 . 0 1 8 )    
(0.028)
National  1.0   —   0.562   1.0   1.0   —   0.407   1.0 
   (0.00)     (0.036)   (0.00)   (0.00)      (0.015)   (0.00) 
Source: Computed by author from CHCS 2001 survey data.
Notes: P0 is the incidence of poverty; ACi is absolute contribution; and RCi is relative contribution. Values in 
parentheses are standard errors.
Non-monetary dimension: Height poverty line
Child health is the non-monetary dimension which is captured by standardized height-
for-age z-scores expressed in percentiles. To obtain standardized heights, 22- and 24-
month-old girls and 24-month-old boys were studied. These yielded nutrition poverty 
lines for both 1996 and 2001 data that intersect and are robust in the interval [2.15th; 
3.77th] percentiles of the cumulative distributions (corresponding to -2 z-scores). For 
the empirical analysis we arbitrarily chose standardization with reference to 24-month-
old girls, and the lower bound of 2.15th percentiles as the height poverty line to use in 
further analysis. 
The national incidence of stunting was 28.8% and 44.3% in 1996 and 2001 respectively. 
These estimates remained unchanged in the interval of the height poverty lines [2.15th; 
3.77th] percentiles (Table 4). The prevalence of height poverty was more widespread in 
rural than in urban regions in Cameroon in both 1996 and 2001. The general picture is 
that child poverty increased between 1996 and 2001.
A quick interpretation of the results in Tables 3 and 4 is that there appears to be a 
divergence in the evolution of money metric poverty and child health at both the national 
and regional levels. 
Table 4: Regional incidence of stunting in Cameroon, 1996 and 2001  
  Height poverty lines (Zu )= [2.15th ; 3.77th] percentiles
  1996  2001
Region  Pop.   P0  ACi  RCi  Pop.   P0  ACi  RCi
  share        share
Yaoundé  0.050   0.272   0.014   0.047   0.100   0.399   0.040   0.090 
   (0.012)   (0.086)   (0.006)   (0.021)   (0.012)   (0.045)   ( 0 . 0 0 6 )    
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Douala   0.040   0.266   0.011   0.037   0.072   0.270   0.019   0.044 
   (0.009)   (0.047)   (0.003)   (0.012)   (0.008)   (0.044)   ( 0 . 0 0 4 )    
(0.009)
Other Towns  0.139   0.219   0.031   0.106   0.143   0.421   0.060   0.136 




  Height poverty lines (Zu )= [2.15th ; 3.77th] percentiles
  1996  2001
Region  Pop.   P0  ACi  RCi  Pop.   P0  ACi  RCi
  share        share
Rural Forest  0.126   0.247   0.031   0.108   0.189   0.459   0.087   0.196 
   (0.039)   (0.034)   (0.011)   (0.041)   (0.036)   (0.039)   ( 0 . 0 1 7 )    
(0.037)
Rural Highlands  0.392   0.283   0.111   0.385   0.265   0.464   0.123   0.278 
   (0.086)   (0.059)   (0.039)   (0.117)   (0.037)   (0.045)   ( 0 . 0 1 8 )    
(0.038)
Rural Savannah  0.253   0.360   0.091   0.316   0.231   0.492   0.114   0.256 
   (0.072)   (0.051)   (0.032)   (0.105)   (0.033)   (0.058)   ( 0 . 0 1 9 )    
(0.038)
National  1.0   —   0.288   1.0   1.0   —   0.443   1.0 
   (0.00)     (0.029)   (0.00)   (0.00)     (0.021)   (0.00) 
Source: Computed by author from CHCS 2001 survey data.
Notes: P0 is the incidence of stunting; ACi  is absolute contribution; and RCi is relative contribution. For 





able 5 presents the Pa class of poverty indexes for Cameroon as a whole and for the   
urban, semi-urban and rural areas. Poverty increased by 20.4 percentage points 
(from 35.8% to 56.2%) between 1984 and 1996 and fell by 15.5 percentage points to 
40.7% in 2001. 
Table 5: Zonal evolution of the Pa class of poverty measures
Zone  1984  1996  2001
  Pop.   P0 P 1 P 2  Pop.   P0 P 1 P 2  Pop.   P0 P 1 P 2
  share        share        share
Urban  0.112   0.009   0.002   0.001   0.297   0.265   0.074   0.031   0.348   0.208   0.056   0.023 
  (0.020)  (0.003)  (0.001)  (0.000)  (0.027)  (0.029)  (0.010)  (0.005)  (0.024)  (0.011)  ( 0 . 0 0 4 )    
(0.002)
 
Semi-  0.176   0.253   0.083   0.038   0.052   0.468   0.141   0.059   0.082   0.294   0.081   0.033 
  Urban (0.045)  (0.043)  (0.018)  (0.010)  (0.024)  (0.111)   (0.041)  (0.019)  (0.010)  (0.020)  ( 0 . 0 0 7 )    
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Rural  0.712   0.440   0.141   0.062   0.651   0.706   0.257   0.120   0.570   0.545   0.184   0.085 
  (0.044)  (0.028)  (0.014)  (0.008)  (0.043)  (0.042)  (0.023)  (0.014)  (0.028)  (0.020)  ( 0 . 0 1 2 )    
(0.008)
 
National  1.0  0.358   0.115   0.051   1.0  0.562   0.197   0.090   1.0  0.407   0.131   0.059 
    (0.027)  (0.012)  (0.006)     (0.034)  (0.017)  (0.010)     (0.015)  ( 0 . 0 0 8 )    
(0.005) 
Source: Computed by the author from BCS 1984, CHCS 1996 and CHCS 2001 survey data. Notes: Overall 
poverty line = FCFA509.41 per adult equivalent per day. Measure of welfare is real expenditures per adult 
equivalent per day (base 2001 = 1). Figures in parentheses represent standard errors. Stratification and 
clustering in the surveys were taken into consideration when setting the sample designs.
Despite the reduction in poverty between 1996 and 2001, it was more widespread, 
deeper and more severe in 2001 than it was in 1984, except in semi-urban areas. The 
same pattern of evolution was observed in urban, semi-urban and rural areas and for the 
incidence, intensity and severity of poverty. As shown in Tables 6 to 8, aggregate poverty 
changes over the period 1996–2001 were statistically significantly different from zero.
Table 6: Zonal decomposition of changes in the head count index (DP0) into within 
and between group effects
  Shapley decomposition approach
  1984–1996   1996–2001
Zone  Intra-zone  Inter-zone  Impact on  Intra-zone  Inter-zone  Impact 
on
  effects  effects   DP0=0.204   effects   effects    DP 0=-
0.155
Urban  0.052   0.025   0.078**   -0.019   0.012   -0.007 
  (0.000)   (0.000)   (0.012)   (0.000)   (0.000)   (0.013) 
Semi-Urban  0.024   -0.045   -0.020   -0.012   0.011   -0.000 
  (0.000)   (0.000)   (0.016)   (0.000)   (0.000)   (0.013) 
Rural  0.181   -0.035   0.146**   -0.098   -0.050   -0.149** 
  (0.000)   (0.000)   (0.052)   (0.000)   (0.000)   (0.046) 
National  0.258   -0.054   0.204**   -0.128   -0.027   -0.155** 
  (0.000)   (0.000)   (0.043)   (0.000)   (0.000)   (0.037) 
Source: Computed by the author from BCS 1984, CHCS 1996 and CHCS 2001 survey data.Notes: Overall 
poverty line = CFAF509.41 per adult equivalent per day. Measure of welfare is real expenditures per adult 
equivalent per day (base 2001 = 1). Stratification and clustering in the surveys were taken into consideration 
when setting the sample designs. ** and * indicate significance at the 1% and 5% levels respectively.
Table 6 submits a sectoral decomposition of the 20.4 percentage point increase of the 
head count index between 1984 and 1996, and the 15.5 percentage point decrease of the 
head count index between 1996 and 2001. Of the 15.5 percentage point decline, rural 
areas significantly accounted for up to -14.9 percentage points which were attributed to 
both within-zone effects (-9.8 points) and between-zone effects (-5.0 points). The absolute 
contributions of urban and semi-urban areas to alleviating the incidence of poverty were 
favourable, but much lower and statistically non-significant in both cases. While all the 
intra-zone effects contributed favourably, the inter-zone population shift effects lessened 
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The results presented in Tables 7 and 8 for the poverty-gap and the squared poverty-
gap sectoral decompositions, basically indicate the same trend as revealed in the analysis 
of the head count index. The contribution of inter-zone effects in reducing rural poverty 
in terms of the incidence, intensity and severity is attributable to the importance of 
migration in the fight against poverty by the poor themselves. Baye (2006b) suggests 
two possible transmission mechanisms that may explain this. The first channel could 
be through remittances made by rural–urban migrants, who generally leave part of their 
family in rural areas and maintain active ties with them.
The second potential transmission channel could be increases in household per capita 
consumption emanating from rural–urban migration in the face of underemployment in 
rural agriculture. In the presence of this underemployment and of rural–urban migration, 
one would expect that rural consumption expenditure would increase—whether 
remittances are received. This is because the potential migrant may be contributing very 
little or nothing to household income. Therefore by leaving, there would be an increase 
in consumption per head or per adult equivalent because the numerator, that is household 
income, would not decline. 
These presumptions are supported by the systematic decline in the population share 
of rural areas (8.1%) and a systematic increase in the population share of urban (5.1%) 
and semi-urban (3.0%) areas in the period 1996–2001 (Table 5), which signifies net out 
migration from rural areas. Moreover, the observation that inter-zone effects accounted 
adversely to urban contributions to the declining incidence, depth and severity of poverty 
(Tables 6 to 8) points to the possibility that migrants might be fuelling urban poverty. This 
view is motivated by the observation that, although rural–urban migrants in Cameroon 
are typically more literate and better educated than other rural residents, on average, they 
are less literate and less educated than other urban residents (Baye, 2006b). In terms of 
household amenities such as refrigerators, type of houses, floors and toilets, migrants 
generally live under more precarious conditions than other urban residents (National 
Institute of Statistics, 2002). 
Rural–urban migrants are usually young men and women with primary school 
education. When they arrive in urban centres, the young men typically engage in informal 
activities such as car washing by the roadside. Eventually, the successful ones become 
taxi drivers, motor mechanics or work as security guards. Their female counterparts 
generally start as babysitters or house girls and end up as tailors, hairdressers, petty 
retailers of food items or sex workers. On average, both groups do better than the typical 
youth resident in rural areas, but worse than the typical urban resident.
Table 7: Zonal decomposition of changes in the poverty-gap index index (DP1) 
into within- and between-group effects
  Shapley decomposition approach
  1984–1996   1996–2001
Zone   Intra-zone   Inter-zone   Impact on   Intra-zone   Inter-zone   Impact on 
  effects  effects  DP1=0.082  effects  effects  DP1=-0.66
Urban  0.015   0.007   0.022**   -0.006   0.003   -0.003 
  (0.000)   (0.000)   (0.004)   (0.000)   (0.000)   (0.004) 
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  (0.000)   (0.000)   (0.005)   (0.000)   (0.000)   (0.004) 
Rural  0.080   -0.012   0.067**   -0.045   -0.018   -0.063** 
  (0.000)   (0.000)   (0.023)   (0.000)   (0.000)   (0.021)
National  0.101   -0.019   0.082**   -0.055   -0.011   -0.066** 
  (0.000)   (0.000)   (0.021)  (0.000)   (0.000)   (0.019) 
Source: Computed by the author from BCS 1984, CHCS 1996 and CHCS 2001 survey data.Notes: Overall 
poverty line = CFAF509.41 per adult equivalent per day. Measure of welfare is real expenditures per adult 
equivalent per day (base 2001 = 1). Stratification and clustering in the surveys were taken into consideration 
when setting the sample designs. ** and * indicate significance at the 1% and 5% levels respectively.
In the same vein, unemployment in Cameroon appears to be more of an urban than a 
rural phenomenon (Table 9). The urban–rural unemployment gap increases steadily over 
time. For example, unemployment was four times higher in urban than in rural areas in 
1987, six times higher in 1996, and over nine times higher in 2001. The main urban areas 
of Yaoundé and Douala registered unemployment rates in 1996 and 2001 much higher 
than the national average. On gender lines, the urban female population appeared to be 
harder hit by unemployment than their male counterparts; in the rural areas the picture 
was somewhat reversed between 1987 and 2001 (see Table 9). 
To sum up this subsection, the within-zone effects were more instrumental in 
accounting for changes in all the Pa class of poverty measures than the inter-zone 
population shift effects in the period under review. The systematic favourable contribution 
of inter-zone effects in alleviating rural poverty and aggravating poverty in urban centres 
points to the important role rural–urban migrants can play in alleviating or at least 
mitigating rural poverty.
Table 8:  Zonal decomposition of changes in the squared poverty-gap index (DP2) 
into within- and between-group effects
  Shapley decomposition approach
  1984–1996   1996–2001
Zone   Intra-zone   Inter-zone   Impact on   Intra-zone   Inter-zone   Impact 
on 
  effects  effects  DP2=0.040  effects  effects  D P 2=-
0.032
Urban  0.006   0.003   0.009**   -0.003   0.001   -0.001 
  (0.000)   (0.000)   (0.002)   (0.000)   (0.000)   (0.002) 
Semi-Urban  0.002   -0.006   -0.004*   -0.002   0.001   -0.000 
  (0.000)   (0.000)   (0.002)   (0.000)   (0.000)   (0.002) 
Rural  0.040   -0.006   0.034**   -0.022   -0.008   -0.030** 
  (0.000)   (0.000)   (0.012)   (0.000)   (0.000)   (0.011) 
National  0.048   -0.009   0.040**   -0.026   -0.006   -0.032** 
  (0.000)   (0.000)   (0.011)  (0.000)   (0.000)   (0.011) 
Source: Computed by the author from BCS 1984, CHCS 1996 and CHCS 2001 survey data.Notes: Overall 
poverty line = CFAF509.41 per adult equivalent per day. Measure of welfare is real expenditures per adult 
equivalent per day (base 2001 = 1). Stratification and clustering in the surveys were taken into consideration 
when setting the sample designs. ** and * indicate significance at the 1% and 5% levels respectively.
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Zone  Male  Female  Cameroon
  1987  1996  2001  1987  1996  2001  1987  1 9 9 6  
2001
Urban  15.6  18.7  17.7  19.3  20.3  20.2  16.7  19.3  18.7
Rural  5.1  4.3  2.6  3.0  1.9  1.8  4.1  3.1  2.2
Cameroon  9.3  9.5  8.2  6.8  6.5  6.8  8.3  8.1  7.5
Yaoundé        30.6  21.5
Douala        23.6  25.6
Sources: GPHC 1987, CHCS 1996, CHCS 2001. 
Decomposition results of well-being changes into mean 
and redistribution effects
I
n this subsection, we consider the mean redistribution decomposition of changes in   
both monetary and non-monetary indicators of well-being. Before performing these 
decompositions, we discuss the evolution of health poverty indexes in the period 1996-
2001. The national prevalence of stunting was 28.8% in 1996. While rural areas registered 
a higher rate of stunting (30.6%), urban and semi-urban areas recorded lower rates than 
the national average (Table 10). In 2001, the prevalence of malnutrition increased to 
44.3%; this time around both semi-urban and rural areas recorded higher rates than 
the national average. Both the intensity and severity of malnutrition charted the same 
pattern in 2001, notably classifying the rural and semi-urban areas as worse-off than 
the national average. 
Table 10:  Zonal nutrition poverty indexes in 1996 and 2001 in Cameroon 
  (Z = 2.15th  percentile)
Zone  1996  2001
  Pop.   P0  P1  P2  Pop.   P0  P1  P2
  Share        Share 
Ur b a n   0.229   0.239   0.176   0.161   0.315   0.379   0.259   0.225 
  (0.056)   (0.030)   (0.021)   (0.019)   (0.029)   (0.024)   (0.019)   (0.018) 
Se m i -Ur b a n   0.051   0.250   0.225   0.212   0.079   0.467   0.347   0.311 
  (0.028)   (0.039)   (0.041)   (0.041)   (0.012)   (0.039)   (0.034)   (0.031) 
rU r a l   0.720   0.306   0.263   0.255   0.606   0.472   0.316   0.288 
  (0.065)   (0.038)   (0.042)   (0.042)   (0.034)   (0.032)   (0.023)   (0.022) 
National  1.0   0.288   0.241   0.232   1.0.   0.443   0.301   0.270 
    (0.029)   (0.032)   (0.032)     (0.021)   (0.015)   (0.014) 
Source: Calculated from child anthropometric information in CHCS 1996 and CHCS 2001 survey data using 
DAD 4.4: Software for Distributive Analysis (Duclos et al., 2004a) 
Notes: P0, P1 and P2 represent stunting, the intensity of stunting and the severity of stunting indexes respectively. 
Figures in parentheses represent standard errors.
The incidence of monetary poverty retreated significantly by 15.5 percentage points 
at the national level (Table 11). An important policy concern would be to account for the 
15.5 percentage point decline in monetary poverty, which is significant at the 1% level. 
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effect) or from an improvement in income distribution (the “redistribution” effect). A 
decomposition of the 15.5 percentage point fall in poverty between 1996 and 2001 shows 
that the decline was due primarily to the effects of economic growth (-10.2 percentage 
points), rather than to redistribution (-5.4 percentage points) (Table 11). The incidence 
of rural poverty retreated significantly by 16.1 percentage points, compared with the 
statistically non-significant decline of 5.8 percentage points and 17.3 percentage points 
in the urban and semi-urban areas respectively. 
Economic growth benefited both rural (-15.0 percentage points) and semi-urban 
(-10.1 percentage point) dwellers, whereas redistribution effects were more important 
in urban areas than growth was (see Tables 11). Redistribution effects slowed down the 
alleviation of both the intensity and severity of rural poverty, but contributed favourably 
in the alleviation of the intensity and severity of poverty in other areas. With the exception 
of urban areas, the growth effects associated with the intensity and severity of poverty 
were dominant in accounting for poverty changes.
Table 11:  Zonal decomposition of changes in well-being measures into growth 
and redistribution components
  Shapley decomposition approach
  1996-2001 
  Monetary poverty  Nutrition poverty
Zone    Growth   Redistribution   Total   Growth   Redistribution   Total 
and Pa  component  component  change  component  c o m p o n e n t  
change
Urban         
P0  -0.002   -0.056   -0.058   0.052   0 . 0 8 8    
0.140** 
  (0.001)   (0.001)   (0.031)   (0.009)  (0.009)  (0.039)
P1  -0.001   -0.017   -0.018   0.045   0 . 0 3 8    
0.083** 
  (0.013)   (0.013)   (0.010)   (0.015)  (0.015)  (0.029)
P2  -0.000   -0.008   -0.008   0.043   0.021   0.064* 
  (0.006)   (0.006)   (0.005)   (0.010)  (0.010)  (0.026)
Semi-Urban         
P0  -0.101   -0.073   -0.173   0.070   0 . 1 4 7    
0.217** 
  (0.019)   (0.019)   (0.113)   (0.014)  (0.014)  (0.055)
P1  -0.042   -0.018   -0.060   0.045   0 . 0 7 8    
0.122** 
  (0.045)   (0.045)   (0.042)   (0.014)  (0.014)  (0.053)
P2  -0.020   -0.006   -0.026   0.048   0.051   0.098 
  (0.021)   (0.021)   (0.020)   (0.018)  (0.018)  (0.051)
Rural         
P0  -0.150   -0.011   -0.161**   0.082   0 . 0 8 5    
0.166** 
  (0.014)   (0.014)   (0.047)   (0.012)    (0.012)  (0.049)
P1  -0.085   0.012   -0.073**  0.046   0.007   0.053 
  (0.025)   (0.025)   (0.026)   (0.012)  (0.012)  (0.048)34 r E s E a r c h Pa P E r  207
P2  -0.049   0.014   -0.036*   0.049   -0.017   0.032 
  (0.014)   (0.014)   (0.016)   (0.014)  (0.014)  (0.047)
National          
P0  -0.102   -0.054   -0.155**   0.080   0 . 0 7 5    
0.155** 
  (0.008)   (0.008)   (0.037)   (0.008)  (0.008)  (0.035)
P1  -0.051   -0.015   -0.066**   0.045   0.014   0.059 
  (0.018)   (0.018)   (0.019)   (0.007)  (0.007)  (0.035)
P2  -0.028   -0.003   -0.032**   0.046   -0.008   0.038 
  (0.010)   (0.010)   (0.011)   (0.008)  (0.008)  (0.035)
Source: Computed by the author from CHCS 1996 and CHCS 2001 survey data.Notes: Poverty line is 
CFAF509.41 per adult equivalent per day for monetary poverty and 2.15th percentile for child nutrition poverty. 
Figures in parentheses represent standard errors. P0, P1 and P2 represent the incidence, intensity and severity 
of poverty (stunting), respectively. Stratification and clustering in the surveys were taken into consideration 
when setting the sample designs. ** and * indicate significance at the 1% and 5% levels respectively.
The results in Table 11 also show the decomposition of changes in child health. 
In sharp contrast to the money-metric measures, the rate of stunting at the national 
level increased significantly by 15.5 percentage points between 1996 and 2000. This 
increase in stunting was approximately equally accounted for by shifts in means and 
redistribution. In rural areas stunting increased significantly by 16.6 percentage points, 
which was also accounted for equally by effects of means and redistribution. For both 
urban and semi-urban areas, increases in the rate of stunting were accounted for mainly 
by the redistribution effects than by shifts in the means. 
Changes in the intensity and severity of stunting are due to growth effects than 
redistribution effects nationally and in rural areas (Table 11). Redistribution effects 
had the tendency to mitigate the increase in the severity of stunting both at the national 
level and in rural areas. However, changes in the intensity and severity of stunting in 
semi-urban areas were associated more with the effects of redistribution than with mean 
shifts. Generally, the results indicated that distances below the poverty line and inequality 
among the stunted was more in urban than in rural areas. 
The results indicated that the effect of shifts in the means was of a slightly smaller 
magnitude than the redistribution effects in explaining changes in malnutrition over time 
among the three zones in Cameroon. For example, any large changes in malnutrition 
over time, such as observed in urban and semi-urban areas, was primarily explained by 
redistribution, rather than by shifts in the means. These results were contrary to the general 
observation in the literature that growth effects tend to dominate redistribution effects 
in explaining changes in both income and health poverty (see Datt and Ravallion, 1992; 
Kakwani, 1997; Balisacan, 1995; Bigsten et al., 2003; Baye, 2006a for income poverty; 
Sahn, 2003 for nutrition poverty). The policy indication here points to the importance 
of policies that promote both the provision and redistribution of health facilities in the 
different regions.
These results highlight the importance of using non-income well-being measures 
to complement money-metric measures. Results from health poverty decomposition 
between 1996 and 2001 sharply contrasted with those obtained from income poverty 
decomposition. This is an indication that these measures may have captured different Ex a c t  co n f i g u r a t i o n  o f  Po v E r t y , in E q u a l i t y  a n d  Po l a r i z a t i o n  tr E n d s   35
aspects of well-being. Different instruments and targeting strategies are therefore likely 
to be required to alleviate poverty in each dimension of well-being. As is also noted in 
Gaiha and Kulkarni (2005), the divergence in the evolution of money-metric poverty 
and child health estimates points to more pervasive deprivation than conventional 
measures of poverty based on income or consumption expenditure shortfalls would imply. 
Indeed, since stunting reflects cumulative nutritional and health deprivation, it is likely 
to persist despite higher incomes. In addition, the decompositions suggest that changes 
in income poverty are driven largely by changes in the means, whereas for child health 
the distribution component seems to be more important, on average. 
Against the backdrop of these contrasting results, does economic growth necessarily 
produce significant reduction in all dimensions of poverty? The answer is, apparently, no. 
These findings need to be explained. Are they evolving from the nature of the measures, a 
problem with the data, and/or do they capture something about the actual constraints and 
opportunities being faced by households? These concerns may contribute to accounting 
for the observed divergences in the two measures of well-being.
Despite attempts to harmonize money-metric indicators inter-temporally to render 
them comparable, this exercise is plagued by the recognition that survey instruments 
often evolve over time, making comparison of results difficult. In addition, the deflators 
used in the exercise are known to be notoriously unreliable. Moreover, money-metric 
indicators are generally skewed to the right, whereas child nutrition is likely to be skewed 
to the left because of biological factors. These patterns may emerge because income 
does not typically include the benefits received from social expenditures on health and 
nutrition. 
Although the characteristics of the measures may be responsible to an extent for some 
of the discrepancies, they cannot account for all of them. The actual constraints and 
opportunities faced by households may be responsible for the bulk of the contrast. While 
household income growth may be attributed mainly to the efforts made by households in 
an era of renewed growth, health is largely a function of the availability of public goods. 
The length of time it takes to upgrade or renovate abandoned health infrastructure after an 
economic rebound may imply a time lag for this infrastructure to respond to favourable 
economic fortunes in terms of adequately providing health services. 
Moreover, the economic rebound in Cameroon is attributable to the 1994 devaluation 
of the CFAF and subsequently to fallout from the HIPC process, which was preceded by 
fiscal austerity measures. The austerity measures requiring the state to scale down public 
expenditure were embedded in the initial SAPs, designed to re-establish macroeconomic 
stability. This resulted in a decline in the availability of public goods. With the attainment 
of the completion point of the HIPC initiative, efforts directed at scaling up the provision 
of social services (including access to affordable health care services and infrastructure 
as enshrined in the PRSP) have taken time to materialize. Hence, it is plausible that 
with economic growth, monetary poverty may be retreating, whereas health poverty is 
still persisting. 
Downsizing expenditures as conditioned by exigencies of the SAPs led to: (1) a halt 
in the construction and equipping of health facilities; (2) a freeze in the hiring of public 
health workers; and (3) the public sector salary cutbacks in 1993. The combination of 
these measures deteriorated the quality of the health delivery systems in Cameroon 
against WHO standards. For example, by 2001 Cameroon had 1 physician for every 36 r E s E a r c h Pa P E r  207
10,000 inhabitants (compared with the WHO standard of 1 for every 3,000), and 1 
nurse for every 2,250 inhabitants (compared with the WHO standard of 1 for every 
1,000) (Government of Cameroon, 2003). These difficulties were experienced when 
new challenges were plaguing the health sector. For example, (1) malaria still accounts 
for 40–50% of morbidity and 28% of hospitalizations; (2) the incidence of HIV/AIDS 
rose from 2% to 11.8% between 1992 and 2002 before declining to 5.5% in 2004, and 
is affecting the working and most reproductive age group and their offspring more than 
any other group; and (3) tuberculosis has intensified in conjunction with HIV/AIDS 
(PNUD, 2002). These outcomes are further undermining and reducing both the quantity 
and quality of the health delivery systems in Cameroon with far-reaching impacts on 
medium- to long-term economic growth via child health and human capital deficiencies. 
These outcomes could, at least in part, account for the observed discrepancies in our 
findings.
Moreover, as opposed to income, anthropometric indicators that reflect child health 
are influenced by the psychological state of the primary caregiver, who like other public 
sector workers, is subjected to poor working conditions and surging prices of basic 
consumables. In this context, weaning and other child feeding practices that are largely 
conditioned by the natural occurrence of trace minerals and vitamin availability in soils 
and foods also suffer. Community factors that influence public health (such as the quality 
of water, sanitation and vaccination coverage), which have been shown to be at least 
equal to income in determining child health (Thomas et al., 1996), may also be important 
in determining the availability and quality of the health care system. 
To sum up, growth and redistribution decomposition of changes in both money-metric 
and health poverty sharply contrast each other. While expenditures per adult equivalent 
registered favourable changes in poverty between 1996 and 2001, health poverty 
deteriorated significantly. While changes in health poverty were largely explained by 
effects of redistribution, changes in income poverty were, on average, overwhelmingly 
attributed to effects of growth. By the very nature of children’s height-for-age as a 
long-term predictor of nutrition and child health and the observation that the economic 
rebound in Cameroon was preceded by austerity measures that led to cutbacks in health 
expenditure, it is possible to attribute our findings to the slow response of health care 
infrastructure to favourable economic fortunes, at least in the short run. Moreover, health 
indicators are likely to be slower moving than income and expenditure.
Decomposition results of inequality trends into within- 
and between-group components 
Evolution of income and health inequalities in Cameroon
T
he results in Table 12 present the evolution of inequality in both the income and   
health dimensions in terms of Gini coefficients for the period 1996–2001. At the 
national level and in urban areas, income inequality regressed by 2.7 percentage points. 
In semi-rural areas the retreat was about 2.5 percentage points, whereas rural income 
inequality increased by 1.4 percentage points. Estimates for nutrition inequality in terms 
of standardized heights increased significantly at the national level by 27 percentage 
points in the period under review (Table 12). The significant increase in rural areas Ex a c t  co n f i g u r a t i o n  o f  Po v E r t y , in E q u a l i t y  a n d  Po l a r i z a t i o n  tr E n d s   37
was more than the overall change and much more than in other zones. Apart from rural 
areas that yielded similar inequality trends, inequality results at the national level and 
in the urban and semi-urban areas once more contrasted drastically in terms of the two 
dimensions of well-being. What is clear from the results is that rural areas experienced 
worsening inequality in both income and health dimensions in the period under review. 
Hence, in both dimensions, trends in inequality were more of a rural than an urban worry 
in Cameroon (Table 12), although in terms of levels, the reverse is true in the income 
dimension. 
These results indicate that health facilities were likely to be relatively better distributed 
in urban than in rural areas in Cameroon. This could be in terms of medical personnel, 
vaccination coverage, and better dissemination and comprehension of information 
about HIV/AIDS and antiretroviral drugs. Indeed, social sector workers, especially 
those in the education and health sectors in Cameroon, typically avoid working in rural 
areas and rural dwellers are likely to be less able to lobby for health infrastructure than 
their urban counterparts are. On average, the influential local politicians and landlords 
generally determine the location of such facilities in rural areas and it is not uncommon 
for facilities to be concentrated in one area. 
In the income dimension, the indication may be that low income earners, with the 
economic rebound, have reduced the gap between them and the rich, the rich may have 
confronted circumstances that adversely affected their incomes or both. A decisive fight 
against corruption by political entrepreneurs may engender such effects on the incomes 
of the corrupt and well-to-do.
Table 12:  Zonal inequalities in the distribution of living standards
Zone  S-Gini income inequality (r=2)    S-Gini health inequalities
  1996  2001  Change   1996  2 0 0 1  
Change
Urban  0.439  0.412  -0.027  0.375  0 . 6 2 8  
0.253**
  (0.021)  (0.012)  (0.024)  (0.032)  (0.016)  (0.036)
Semi-Urban  0.364  0.339  -0.025  0.421  0 . 6 7 7  
0.256**
  (0.024)  (0.008)  (0.026)  (0.056)  (0.027)  (0.062)
Rural  0.313  0.327  0.014  0.412  0 . 6 9 5  
0.283**
  (0.018)  (0.008)  (0.020)  (0.030)  (0.019)  (0.035)
National  0.429  0.403  -0.027  0.404  0 . 6 7 4  
0.270**
  (0.018)  (0.009)  (0.020)  (0.022)  (0.014)  (0.026)
Source: Calculated from CBCS 1984, CHCS 1996 and CHCS 2001 (see DSCN and National Institute of 
Statistics) survey data using DAD 4.4: Software for Distributive Analysis (Duclos et al., 2004a). Measure of 
welfare is real expenditures per adult equivalent per day (base 2001 = 1).
Notes: Figures in parentheses represent standard errors. Stratification and clustering in the surveys were 
taken into consideration when setting the sample designs. ** and * indicate significance at the 1% and 5% 
levels respectively.
Inter-temporal decomposition of inequalities38 r E s E a r c h Pa P E r  207
The decomposition of inequality trends is performed using both income and non-
income well-being indicators. The decomposition of income inequality in the period 
1996–2000 is presented in Table 13. In 1996, of the income Gini of 42.9%, the within-
group contribution (28.4%) was much higher than that of the between-group component 
(14.5%). By 2001 the within-group contribution was slightly reinforced, whereas the 
between-group contribution had retreated. The -2.7 percentage point change in income 
inequality was over-accounted for by the between-group contribution (-3.7 percentage 
points), while the within-group component (1.0 percentage points) worked contrary to 
the decline. The bulk of the within-group income inequality was captured in the rural 
areas in both 1996 and 2001. 
Table 14 presents zonal decomposition of levels and changes in health inequalities into 
within and between subgroup effects. Rural areas accounted for up to 72.7% of national 
health inequality in 1996; urban areas accounted for 21% and semi-urban areas only 
accounted for 5.2%. In 2001 the rankings were maintained but the contribution of the 
rural areas dropped in favour of those of urban and semi-urban areas. For the two periods, 
total health inequality was overwhelmingly accounted for by the within-group component, 
99% and 94.4% respectively. The results in Table 14 also present a decomposition of 
changes in health inequalities. While the relative contribution of urban and semi-urban 
areas increased between 1996 and 2001, the relative contribution of rural areas decreased. 
Of the 27 percentage point increase in health inequalities, the within-group contribution 
was 23.6 percentage points and the between-group contribution was only 3.4 percentage 
points. Rural areas contributed to mitigate the rise in the within-group inequality. 
Both dimensions of well-being confirmed the dominant contribution of within-group 
inequality in the distribution of well-being in Cameroon. However, while the between-
group contribution was negligible in the health dimension, it was non-negligible in the 
income dimension of inequality (see Tables 13 and 14). These results revealed that greater 
efficiency could be achieved in reducing overall health inequalities if policy objectives 
were aimed at tackling inequality within the different zones; very little appeared to be 
gained if emphasis is placed on zonal disparities. In terms of the income dimension, 
adopting an optimal-mix of within- and between-group considerations appeared to be 
more appropriate in scaling down income inequality rather than concentrating only on 
one of them.
Table 13:  Zonal  inter-temporal decompositions of income inequalities, 
  1996–2001
Zone	 Shapley	value	decomposition	of	the	S-Gini	coefficient	(r	=	2)
  1996  2001  Change
  Estimate  RCi  Estimate  RCi  Estimate  RCi
Urban  0.116   0.269   0.128  0.319  0.013   0.050 
Semi-Urban  0.015   0.035   0.022  0.055  0.007   0.020 
Rural  0.154   0.358   0.144  0.357  -0.010   -0.000 
Intra-group  0.284   0.662   0.295  0.732  0.010   0.070 
Inter-group  0.145   0.338   0.108  0.268  -0.037   -0.070 
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Source: Calculated from CBCS 1984, CHCS 1996 and CHCS 2001 (see DSCN and National Institute of 
Statistics) survey data using DAD 4.4: Software for Distributive Analysis (Duclos et al., 2004a). Measure of 
welfare is real expenditures per adult equivalent per day (base 2001 = 1).Note: RCi is relative contribution 
to total inequality.
Table 14:  Zonal inter-temporal decompositions of health inequalities
Zone	 Shapley	value	decomposition	of	the	S-Gini	coefficient	(r	=	2)
  1996  2001  Change
  Estimate  RCi   Estimate  RCi   Estimate  RCi 
Urban  0.085   0.210   0.195   0.290   0.110   0.079 
Semi-Urban  0.021   0.052   0.050   0.073   0.028   0.021 
Rural  0.294   0.727   0.391   0.580   0.098   -0.147 
Intra-group  0.400   0.990   0.636  0.944  0.236   -0.047 
Inter-group  0.004   0.010   0.038  0.056  0.034   0.047 
National  0.404  1.0  0.674  1.0  0.270  0
Source: Calculated from child anthropometric information in CHCS 1996 and CHCS 2001 survey data using 
DAD 4.4: Software for Distributive Analysis (Duclos et al., 2004a).Notes: RCi is relative contribution to total 
inequality.
Tables 15 and 16 provide a breakdown of the generalized entropy class of indexes 
(for q =1) into within-zone and between-zone components. In the income dimension 
(Table 15), urban areas represented 29.7% and 34.4% of the total population, accounted 
for 169% and 145% of average total expenditure, and contributed 49 percentage points 
and 52 percentage points to within-zone inequality in 1996 and 2001 respectively. The 
semi-urban areas represented 5.2% and 8.2% of the population, with per capita total 
expenditure that approximated the national average and contributed about 3.3 percentage 
points and 5.3 percentage points to within-zone inequality in 1996 and 2001 respectively. 
Rural areas hosted about 65% and 57% of the total population, with per capita total 
expenditures that represented only 68% and 72% of the national average; these areas 
contributed 21.4 percentage points and 23.4 percentage points to within-zone inequality 
in 1996 and 2001 respectively.
Table 15:  Zonal decomposition of entropy class of measures in the distribution 
of income inequalities (q =1), 1996–2001
Zone  1996  2 0 0 1  
Absolute 
  fg    Contributions  fg    Contributions 
change
  Absolute  Relative  Absolute  Relative  
Urban  0.297   1.687   0.178   0.490   0.348  1.448  0.178  0 . 5 4 2  
0.000
  (0.027)   (0.104)   (0.026)   (0.033)   (0.024)  (0.040)  (0.019)  ( 0 . 0 2 8 )  
(0.001)
Semi-Urban  0.052   1.074   0.012   0.033   0.082  1.073  0.017  0 . 0 5 3  
0.005**
  (0.024)   (0.213)   (0.006)   (0.016)   (0.010)  (0.042)  (0.002)  ( 0 . 0 0 7 )  
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Rural  0.651   0.680   0.078   0.214   0.570  0.716  0.077  0 . 2 3 4  
-0.001
  (0.043)   (0.041)   (0.012)   (0.046)   (0.028)  (0.019)  (0.006)  ( 0 . 0 2 6 )  
(0.001)
Intra-group      0.268   0.737      0.273  0 . 8 2 9  
0.004*
      (0.038)         (0.021)   
(0.002)0
Inter-group      0.098  0.263      0.056  0 . 1 7 1  
-0.042**
      (0.002)        (0.001)   
(0.001)
National      0.364   1.0      0.329  1 . 0  
-0.035**
      (0.038)         (0.021)   
(0.001)
Source: Calculated from CBCS 1984, CHCS 1996 and CHCS 2001 survey data using DAD 4.4: Software for 
Distributive Analysis (Duclos et al., 2004a). Measure of welfare is real expenditures per adult equivalent per 
day (base 2001 = 1).
Notes: Figures in parentheses represent standard errors. fg is the population share and  Î
Îg
 is income share. 
Stratification and clustering in the surveys were taken into consideration when setting the sample designs. ** 
and * indicate significance at the 1% and 5% levels respectively.
The components of inequality between these different zones were 26.3% and 17.1% 
of total inequality in 1996 and 2001 respectively. These figures equally show that any 
policy aimed at reducing income gaps between these areas will not be insignificant in 
modifying total inequality. The within-area components of inequality of 74% and 83% 
in 1996 and 2001 respectively, however, reveal a greater efficiency in reducing total 
inequality in Cameroon if policy objectives attribute greater weights on measures aimed 
at scaling down inequality within the different areas.
In Table 16 we see the zonal decomposition of health inequalities by the generalized 
entropy class of measures (for q =1) for the years 1996 and 2001. The trend was basically 
the same as that traced by the decomposition of the Gini coefficient. In 1996, rural areas 
hosted 72% of the under-three year old population, accounted for heights that were slightly 
lower than the national average, and contributed up to 74% to overall health inequalities. 
Urban areas represented 23% of the children, with standardized heights in excess of the 
national average and contributed only about 21% to overall health inequalities. Semi-rural 
areas accommodated only about 5% of children, had the lowest standardized heights 
compared to the national average and contributed 5% to overall health inequality.
Table 16:  Zonal decomposition of entropy class of measures in the distribution 
of health inequalities (q = 1)
Zone   1996   2001  Change
  fg    Contributions  fg    Contributions 
  Estimate Relative   Estimate Relative
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Urban  0.229  1.048  0.090   0.211  0.315  1.239  0.285   0.337  0.195
  (0.056)  (0.061)  (0.022)   (0.057)  (0.029)  (0.081)  (0.031)   (0.031) 
Semi-Urban  0.051  0.965  0.022   0.051  0.079  0.936  0.063   0.075  0.041
  (0.028)  (0.100)  (0.013)   (0.031)  (0.012)  (0.110)  (0.011)   (0.012) 
Rural  0.720  0.987  0.316   0.738  0.606  0.884  0.484   0.573  0.168
  (0.065)  (0.021)  (0.048)   (0.069)  (0.034)  (0.048)  (0.036)   (0.041) 
Intra-group      0.427  1.0      0.832  0.985  0.405
      (0.037)        (0.035)   
Inter-group      0.000  0.0      0.013  0.015  0.013
      (0.000)        (0.000)   
National      0.428        0.845    0.417
      (0.037)        (0.035)   
Source: Calculated from child anthropometric information in CHCS 1996 and CHCS 2001 survey data using 
DAD 4.4: Software for Distributive Analysis (Duclos et al., 2004a).
Notes: Figures in parentheses represent standard errors. fgis the population share and  mg/m is the health 
share. Stratification and clustering in the surveys were taken into consideration when setting the sample 
designs. ** and * indicate significance at the 1% and 5% levels respectively.
In 2001, the pattern was maintained. For both periods, the within-group components 
principally accounted for the 41.7 percentage points change in the overall generalized 
entropy measure (for q = 1). Of the 40.5 percentage points contribution of the within-
zone inequality to the global change, urban areas contributed substantially (about 20 
percentage points), followed by rural areas (about 17 percentage points). Between-group 
contribution to the overall change in health inequality was minimal.
These results point to the wisdom of considering the redistribution of health facilities 
and services within-zones rather than between-zones if the intention is to reduce overall 
health inequalities in Cameroon. This is the case because within-group health inequalities 
appeared to be more of a problem than between-group inequalities. This again indicates 
that the local political elite may be influential in diverting health infrastructure and 
personnel to their specific areas of origin within the different zones of the country. This 
would likely engender substantial variation within than between zones in the health and 
nutritional status of children.
Shifts in polarization indexes compare with inequality 
measures
A
s intimated earlier, inequality indexes essentially measure the overall spread of the   
distribution of living standards. They emphasize the deviation from the global mean, 
ignoring clustering around local means, an aspect that polarization measures do capture. 
This possibility has led to calls for polarization measures to be used to complement 
inequality estimates to gain a clearer picture of the distribution of living standards. 
Table 17: Zonal inequalities and polarization trends in the distribution of living 
standards
Zone  S-Gini income inequality (r = 2)    Wolfson polarization index 
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  1996  2001  Change   1996  2001  Change
Urban  0.439  0.412  -0.027  0.392  0.326  -0.066 *
   (0.021)  (0.012)  (0.024)  (0.031)  (0.008)  (0.032)
Semi-Urban  0.364  0.339  -0.025  0.398  0.293  -0.105
   (0.024)  (0.008)  (0.026)  (0.128)  (0.014)  (0.129)
Rural  0.313  0.327  0.014  0.248  0.280  0.032
   (0.018)  (0.008)  (0.020)  (0.018)  (0.009)  (0.020)
National  0.429  0.403  -0.027  0.360  0.335  -0.025
   (0.018)  (0.009)  (0.020)  (0.025)  (0.008)  (0.027)
Source: Calculated from CHCS 1996 and CHCS 2001 survey data using DAD 4.4: Software for Distributive 
Analysis (Duclos et al., 2004a). Measure of welfare is real expenditures per adult equivalent per day (base 2001 
= 1).
Notes: Figures in parentheses represent standard errors. Stratification and clustering in the surveys were 
taken into consideration when setting the sample designs. ** and * indicate significance at the 1% and 5% 
levels respectively.
As shown in Table 17, Wolfson polarization estimates charted trends similar to 
those of the Gini indexes at the national and zonal levels. Both indexes reduced at the 
national level, and in the urban and semi-urban areas between 1996 and 2001. Both 
inequality and polarization became worse in rural Cameroon during the same period, 
yet in terms of levels, polarization and inequality were more of a problem in urban 
and semi-urban areas. These results therefore indicate that polarization indexes do 
not give distinctly different results from standard measures of inequality in the period 
under study in Cameroon. 
Estimates of the Duclos-Esteban-Ray (2004) class of polarization indexes are 
presented in Table 18. This table portrays similar tendencies as those depicted by 
polarization according to Wolfson and by inequality in the Gini index. Polarization 
remained more serious in urban than in rural areas, yet trends showed increasing 
polarization in rural areas between 1996 and 2001. As more weighting was given to the 
identification effect by increasing the parameter a up to 0.5, trends in polarization and 
inequality were consistent. Even when a increased to 1, the trend was consistent, except 
in rural areas where polarization was shown to marginally retreat. By the very nature of 
the Duclos-Esteban-Ray class of polarization measures, as one becomes more polarization 
sensitive (that is, as the parameter a is increased), polarization diverges increasingly from 
inequality. Thus, the isolated result in rural areas for a = 1 cannot be considered evidence 
of divergence between polarization and inequality rankings in Cameroon in the period 
1996–2001. Moreover, the extent to which inequality rankings resemble polarization 
rankings depends on the parameters a and r which essentially capture the power of the 
identification effect and the inequality aversion respectively.
Table 18: Zonal polarization trends in the distribution of living standards Ex a c t  co n f i g u r a t i o n  o f  Po v E r t y , in E q u a l i t y  a n d  Po l a r i z a t i o n  tr E n d s   43
(POLDER)
Zone  Duclos-Esteban-Ray class of indexes
  1996  2001  Change
Urban    
 a=0.25  0.320  0.299  -0.021
 a=0.5  0.261  0.248  -0.013
 a=1  0.205  0.201  -0.004
Semi-Urban    
 a=0.25  0.299  0.263  -0.036
 a=0.5  0.257  0.220  -0.038
 a=1  0.210  0.174  -0.036
Rural   44 r E s E a r c h Pa P E r  207
 a=0.25  0.247  0.253  0.006
 a=0.5  0.211  0.212  0.001
 a=1  0.175  0.169  -0.006
National    
a=0.25  0.311  0.293  -0.018
  (0.011)  (0.005)  (0.012)
 a=0.5  0.259  0.243  -0.015
  (0.009)  (0.004)  (0.010)
 a=1  0.214  0.196  -0.018
  (0.010)  (0.004)  (0.011)
Source: Calculated from CHCS 1996 and CHCS 2001 survey data using DAD 4.4: Software for Distributive 
Analysis (Duclos et al., 2004a). Measure of welfare is real expenditures per adult equivalent per day (base 2001 
= 1).
Notes: Figures in parentheses represent standard errors. Stratification and clustering in the surveys were 
taken into consideration when setting the sample designs. ** and * indicate significance at the 1% and 5% 
levels respectively.
The findings of this study indicate that polarization and inequality were more correlated 
than they were distinct. Results from the Kanbur-Zang polarization index are consistent 
with these findings (Table 19). We are therefore unable to empirically distinguish between 
inequality and polarization within the period under study in Cameroon. Similar results 
are found in the literature (see Zhang and Kanbur, 2001) and we attribute our findings to 
the likelihood that although well-being improved generally between 1996 and 2001 in 
Cameroon, the distribution of well-being exhibited a tendency of downgrading of some 
of the rich and the swelling of mid-level standards of living leading to improvements in 
both inequality and polarization, and the respect of the Pigou-Dalton condition by both 
indexes. These results could have been suspected from the observation that in terms of 
well-being households were more dispersed within-zones than between zones in the 
period between 1996 and 2001.
Table 19: Polarization trends in the distribution of living standards (POLZ-K)
  1996  2001  Change
  Gini  GE(q=1)  Gini  GE(q=1)  Gini  GE(q=1)
Inter-group  0.145  0.098  0.108  0.056
Intra-group  0.284  0.268  0.295  0.273
POLZ-K  0.511  0.366  0.366  0.205  -0.144  -0.161
Source: Inter-group and intra-group inequalities are extracted from Tables 13 and 15 for the Gini and generalized 
entropy class for q=1 respectively. POLZ-K is the polarization index proposed by Zang and Kanbur (2001), 
which is the ratio of the inter-group and intra-group inequality components.
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5.  Conclusion
T
his study has attempted to comprehensively analyse poverty, inequality and   
polarization trends using Cameroon household surveys in the period before and   
during the HIPC process. An exact decomposition rule motivated by the Shapley 
value provided the basis for the theoretical frameworks used in the study. Empirical 
results were distilled from DAD 4.4 using money-metric and child nutrition data in the 
form of height-for-age z-scores, as indicators of well-being. 
The research issues were condensed into the following concerns: Does economic 
growth necessarily produce significant reduction in all dimensions of poverty? What is the 
relative importance of within- and between-group components in accounting for poverty 
and inequality trends? What is the relative importance of growth and redistribution 
effects of changes in indicators of well-being? Do trends in polarization tell dissimilar 
stories to trends in inequality?
In an effort to provide responses, the paper empirically: (1) constructed monetary 
poverty lines using non-parametric procedures and nutrition poverty lines by a data 
standardization process; (2) assessed the within- and between-zone contributions to 
changes in aggregate poverty; (3) evaluated the mean and distribution effects of changes 
in both income and health poverty; (4) decomposed inequality trends into within- and 
between-group components using both income and child health indicators; and (5) 
examined shifts in polarization indices. 
Using expenditures per adult equivalent, within-zone effects were found to be more 
instrumental in accounting for aggregate changes in all the Pa class of poverty measures 
than the inter-zone population shift effects in the period under review. The observation 
that inter-zone effects were systematically contributing to alleviating rural poverty, but 
aggravating urban poverty, is indication of the important role rural–urban migrants 
may play in alleviating or at least mitigating rural poverty. Two possible transmission 
mechanisms were proffered to explain this: Remittances made by rural–urban migrants, 
who generally leave part of their family in rural areas and maintain active ties with 
them; and (2) the rural consumption increasing effects of migration in the face of 
underemployment in rural agriculture, with or without remittances.
Changes in money-metric poverty and health deprivation sharply contrasted each 
other. While expenditures per adult equivalent registered favourable changes in all the 
Pa class of poverty measures in the period 1996–2001, health deprivation deteriorated 
significantly. In addition, changes in health poverty were largely explained by effects of 
redistribution, while changes in income poverty were, on average, attributable to effects 
of growth. These results highlight the importance of using non-income indicators to 46 r E s E a r c h Pa P E r  207
complement money-metric measures of well-being. Thus, economic growth may not 
necessarily engender significant reduction in all dimensions of well-being.
The indication is that alternative measures may be capturing different aspects of well-
being. Different instruments and targeting strategies are, therefore, likely to be required 
to alleviate poverty in each of the dimensions. As noted in Gaiha and Kulkarni (2005), 
however, the observed divergence in the evolution of money-metric poverty and child 
health estimates points to more pervasive deprivation than conventional measures of 
poverty based on income or consumption expenditure shortfalls would capture. Indeed, 
since stunting reflects cumulative nutritional and health deprivation, it is likely to persist 
despite higher incomes. Moreover, as the re-establishment of macroeconomic stability 
and growth in Cameroon in the mid 1990s was preceded by austerity measures that led 
to cutbacks in social sector interventions, our findings are attributable, at least in part, 
to the slow response of a deteriorated healthcare infrastructure to short-term favourable 
economic fortunes. 
Both income and non-income dimensions highlighted the dominant contribution 
of within-group inequality in the distribution of well-being in Cameroon. While the 
between-group contribution to inequality trends was found to be negligible in the health 
dimension, it was found to be non-negligible in the income space. These results point 
to the wisdom of considering the redistribution of health facilities and services within-
zones rather than between-zones if the intention is to cost-effectively reduce overall 
health inequalities in Cameroon. In the monetary space, an optimal mix of within- and 
between-group measures would be required to address overall inequality. 
Inequality and polarization reduced nationally, and in urban and semi-urban areas 
in the period 1996–2001. Meanwhile, inequality and polarization got worse in rural 
Cameroon. In terms of levels, however, polarization and inequality were more of an 
urban than a rural problem. These results indicate that polarization indexes do not 
yield distinctly different results from standard measures of inequality in Cameroon. 
The indication is therefore that polarization and inequality are more correlated and we 
are unable to empirically make a distinction using the available Cameroon household 
surveys. 
An important result emanating from this study is that rural areas were hardest hit by 
poverty, inequality and polarization trends in both the income and health dimensions. 
The bottom line for sustained reduction in income poverty, inequality and polarization is 
an advocacy for growth-based labour-intensive policies that create opportunities for the 
rural poor to increase their incomes — such as construction or rehabilitation of farm-to-
market roads and other infrastructure in the context of a strategy to structurally transform 
the agricultural sector. In terms of child health and perhaps general health, emphasis is on 
redistribution and intra-zonal placement of health personnel and infrastructure, especially 
within the context of the ongoing decentralization drive in Cameroon.
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Notes
1.  See Cornia et al. (1995) and Woodward (1992) for a discussion of this view and the 
conventional view frequently associated with the World Bank and the International 
Monetary Fund (IMF) by neo-liberal critics.
2.  For a perusal of the HIPC triggers, see Cameroon’s Decision Point Document formulated 
in 2000 (IMF-World Bank, 2000). 
3.  As outlined by Shorrocks (1999) and reviewed by Kaboré (2002), standard decomposition 
techniques typically confront four major problems: (1) the contribution assigned to each 
specific factor does not always have an intuitively clear meaning; (2) decomposition 
procedures are only applicable to certain poverty and inequality indexes ; (3) the types 
of contributing factors considered are usually limited; and (4) above all, conventional 
decomposition methods lack a shared theoretical framework.
4.  For a development and review of sectoral decomposition, see Shorrocks (1999) and Baye 
(2006b).48 r E s E a r c h Pa P E r  207
5.  It may be noted here that the family of Atkinson indices is a special case of GE(q) if we 
constrain q to be no greater than 1 and let q=1-e. Under these conditions, if the Atkinson 
index GE(e) indicates that there is more inequality in a distribution A than in a distribution 
B, then the index GE(q) with q=1-e will also indicate more inequality in A than in B.
6.  The axioms are articulated on the basis of the following characteristic of polarization: 
(1) it is a matter of groups, isolated individuals should have little weight; (2) there must 
be a high degree of homogeneity within each group; (3) there must be a high degree of 
heterogeneity across groups; and (4) there must be a small number of significantly sized 
groups (Esteban, 2002).
7.  The international reference standard (IRS) recommends ±2SD values as the upper and 
lower limits of normality for all anthropometric indices.
8.  This element is reflected in the properties of distributional sensitivity and strong 
monotonicity. Distributional sensitivity is the idea that transferring income from the poorest 
to the better-off poor should raise measured “poverty”, and strong monotonicity requires 
that increasing some poor person’s income, while holding the other poor person’s income 
constant, should necessarily reduce poverty.
9.  For the conceptual difficulties involved in setting poverty lines by the CBN and the FEI 
methods, see Ravallion and Bidani (1994).
10.  Codes associated with food items were changed to those found in the document containing 
calorie values before carrying out the analysis.
11.  The annual quantities of calories per food item were obtained taking into consideration 
the periodicity and frequency of purchases as elicited during the survey. As an example, if 
periodicity is a month and the frequency is three times a month, then the annual quantity 
of calories = the number of calories of the food item × 3 × 12.
12.  Developed by Duclos et al. (2004a), researchers at Laval University, Quebec, Canada.
13.  This poverty line is approximately equal to the usual one dollar per day poverty line.
14.  The Shapley value can also be interpreted as the expected marginal contribution made 
by the player (or factor) to the value of a coalition, where the distribution of coalitions is 
such that any ordering of the players (or factors) is equally likely.
15.  For proof of these Shapley’s axioms in the context of distributive analysis, see Shorrocks 
(1999: 5–6).
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Appendix 1: Rearranging regions to 
approximate the 1996 
nomenclature
Adjusted regions in 1984  Regions in 1996  Regions in 2001
Yaoundé  Yaoundé  Yaoundé
Douala  Douala  Douala
Urban areas of the then seven   Other towns  Urban areas of the 10 provinces
  provinces (excluding Yaoundé     (excluding  Yaoundé  and 
Douala)
  and Douala)
Forest region (Cocoa and Tobacco   Rural forest  Rural zones of Centre, East, 
and
  producing areas of East Province     South provinces
  and the then Centre-South 
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  Province excluding Yaoundé 
Highlands and coast (coffee   Rural highlands  Rural zones of West, North
  producing areas of the West and     West, and South West
  Northwest provinces and Moungo 
  division in the Littoral Province, as 
  well as rubber and oil palm 
  producing areas of Southwest and 
  Littoral excluding Douala)
Steppe and Savannah (livestock   Rural savannah  Rural zones of Far North, North,
  and cotton producing areas of     and Adamawa provinces
  the then grand North Province, 
  now Far North, North, and 
  Adamawa provinces)     
Compiled by author based on data from the 1984, 1996 and 2001 household surveys.
Appendix 2: Regional price indices used 
for spatial harmonization of 
expenditures in the three 
databases
No.  Regions  Price index 
1.  Yaoundé  1
2.  Douala   1.01
   Provinces  Urban  Rural
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3.  Adamawa  0.99  0.98
4.  Centre  0.88  0.92
5.  East  0.88  0.92
6.  Far North  0.94  0.76
7.  Littoral  0.91  0.80
8.  North  0.90  0.78
9.  Northwest  0.84  0.80
10.  West  0.89  0.81
11.  South  0.93  0.94
12.  Southwest  0.84  0.87
Source: Extracted from the CHCS II by the author
Appendix 3: Consumer price indices
























Source: World Bank (2004) African Database, CD ROM 2004.
Appendix 4: Theoretical framework 
and some decomposition 
approaches
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T
his appendix: (1) describes the Shapley value; and (2) reviews the sectoral   
decomposition of changes in well-being and the growth and redistribution   
decomposition of changes across dimensions of well-being in full. 
Theoretical framework: Description of the Shapley value
A
n important issue in distributive analysis would be how to assign weights to the   
factors that contribute to an observed level or change in a measure of living 
standards. For instance, the level and/or change of a distributive index between two 
dates may be attributable to factors such as within-sector and between-sector effects or to 
means and redistributive components. Analysts are interested in quantifying the relative 
importance of each component. There are different methods to perform the attribution, 
all of which must deal with the fact that the contribution of a factor depends on the 
presence of the other factors. This issue is similar to problems that arise in cooperative 
game theory, and recent literature in distributive analysis is proposing and applying an 
attribution according to the Shapley value (see Rongve, 1995; Chantreuil and Trannoy, 
1997; Shorrocks, 1999; Kaboré, 2002; Araar, 2003; Baye, 2006a; Baye, 2006b). We 
first appeal to cooperative game theory before applying the solution set to decomposed 
changes in poverty and inequality across dimensions of well-being.
A typical question to address is what might each player reasonably expect to receive 
(or pay) as his or her share of the reward (or cost) in a cooperative game? The solution 
concept widely used in the theory of cooperative games to answer such questions is the 
Shapley value (see Owen, 1977; Moulin, 1988) which provides a recommendation for 
the division of the joint profits or costs of the grand coalition, while satisfying some 
reasonable properties.
For instance, let K = {1, 2, …, k,…, m} be a finite set of players. Non-empty subsets 
of K are called coalitions. To accomplish the division process, the players may form 
coalitions and the strength of each coalition is expressed as a characteristic function v. 
For any coalition or subset S Î K, v(S) measures the share of the surplus or loss that the 
coalition, S, is capable of appropriating without resorting to agreements with players 
belonging to other coalitions.
For each player k, kÎS, Shapley (1953) proposes a value based on the player’s 
marginal contribution — defined as the weighted mean of the marginal contributions 
v(SÎ{k}) - v(S) of player k in all coalitions S Î K- {k}. That is, player k is attributed 
the extra amount brought to the existing coalition of players. To identify this value, 
imagine that the m players are randomly ranked in some order or join the game in a 
random order, defined by s:
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and then are successively eliminated in that order. The elimination of players reduces 
the share accruing to the group of those not yet eliminated. When the coalition, S, is 
composed of s elements, we can only find the value they will obtain, v(S), when the first 
s elements of s are exactly the elements of S. The weight of the coalition S, is measured 
by the probability that the first s elements of s are all elements of S. This probability is 
found by dividing the number of ordered arrangements of which the first s elements are 
all in S by the total number of possible ordered arrangements. The numerator can be 
obtained by imagining that the first s players are arranged in a sequence and the remaining 
m-s-1 players are also orderly arranged in another sequence.
The number of possible ordered arrangements is the number of permutations of m 
players taken m at a time, which is m!. By the same reasoning, since the first s players 
yield s! number of permutations, the remaining m-s-1 players would yield (m-s-1)! 
number of permutations. The number of ordered arrangements in which the first s players 
are all elements of S is thus given by s!(m-s-1)!.
The weight (or probability) that the first s elements of s are all elements of S is thus 
defined by s!(m-s-1)!/m!, where s is the size of the coalition S. This weight also measures 
the probability that the player before player k will be in S. The Shapley value of player k, 
denoted by  (K,v), is thus the weighted mean of his marginal contributions v(SÎ{k}) 
- v(S) over the set of coalitions S Î K- {k} given by: 15
  (A2) 
where by convention, 0! = 1 and v(Î) = 0 
To apply the Shapley value in distributive analysis instead of considering m players as 
in cooperative game theory, we now consider m factors that contribute in the explanation 
of an observed phenomenon. The Shapley value given in Equation A2 satisfies all three 
of Shapley’s axioms, which state that: 
(1) The expression  (K,v), should be symmetric (or anonymous) in the sense that the 
contributions assigned to any given factor should not depend on the way in which 
the factors are labelled or listed. In other words,  (K,v), should be independent 
of the factor’s label, 1, 2, …, m; and 
(2) The decomposition should be efficient, that is, it should be exact and additive so that, 
for   and   (K,v) Î  (K,v)= Î and  (K,v) = v(K). That is, 
the intuitively appealing contributing factors should form a partition, so that there is no 
need for vague concepts such as residual or interaction terms to secure the identity of 
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Since by the additivity axiom the set of factors completely determine the aggregate 
indicator, which could be at levels or changes, it is convenient to assume that v(Î) = 0, 
in the sense that the aggregate indicator is zero when all the factors are extracted.
Sectoral decomposition of changes in monetary poverty
The Ravallion-Huppi (1991) procedure 
Ravallion and Huppi (1991) exploit the additive decomposability of the Pa class of poverty 
measures to throw light on the relative importance of changes within sectors versus 
changes between them, such as due to the between sector population or work-force shifts. 
This decomposition of the aggregate poverty change is not exact because it requires an 
interaction term to establish its identity. Using the above notations, the Ravallion-Huppi 
decomposition of an aggregate change in poverty can be expressed as:
  (Within sector effects)
     (Between sector population 
      shift effects)
     (Interaction effects)  (A4)
The within-sector effects are simply the contribution of poverty changes within 
sectors, controlling for their base period population shares. The between-group population 
shift effects are the contribution of changes in base period poverty due to changes in 
the distribution of the population across sectors between the base and terminal periods. 
The residual or interaction effects arise from the possible correlation between population 
shifts and within sector changes in poverty. 
It has been suggested that the interaction term can be made to vanish by taking the 
average of the results from the initial and terminal periods as base periods. The problem 
with the averaging method is that it is not based on any theoretical underpinning. But 
this gap is filled when we appeal to the Shapley value approach.
Rationalization of the averaging method: The Shapley approach to 
sectoral decomposition
Let us denote the within sector factors by W and the between sector population shift 
factors by B. This implies that Equation 1 in the main text can also be expressed using 
the characteristic function v as DPa = va(W,B). Here we have only two factors and the 
two elimination sequences are given by {W, B} and {B, W}.
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in panel (a) of Table A1 and the weight and marginal contributions of the between sector 
population shift effects B, is given in panel (b). 
Table A1: Application of Equation A2 for within-sector effects and between-sector   
population shift effects
   S  s    v(SÎ{k})-v(S)
          (marginal contributions)
Panel (a)
No of   0  Î  0  0.5  v(ÎÎ{W})-v(Î) = v(W)
elements in   1  {B}  1  0.5  v(BÎ{W})-v(B) = v(W,B)-v(B)
S before W 
 
Panel (b)        
No of   0  Î  0  0.5  v(ÎÎ{B})-v(Î) = v(B)
elements in   1  {W}  1  0.5  v(WÎ{B})-v(W) = v(W,B)-v(W)
S before B 
Table A1 gives us the Shapley contributions of the within-sector effects,  (2,v), 
(Equation A5) and the Shapley contributions of between-sector population shift effects, 




When the within-sector effects are absent, W takes the value 0, and the change in 
poverty from Equation A3 becomes:
  (A7)
Eliminating the between-sector population shift effects is tantamount to setting B = 
0 and the change in poverty becomes:
  (A8)
By substituting (Equation 1 in the main text), (A7) and (A8) in (A5) and (A6), the 60 r E s E a r c h Pa P E r  207
full expressions of the Shapley contributions for W and B are given as Equations A9 
and A10.
 
    
 
    (A9)
Following the same procedure for the contributions of the factor B, we have:
 
    (A10)
Equation 1 in the main text explaining the overall change in poverty can now be 
rewritten in terms of exactly two components: Changes in poverty within-sector and 
between-sector population shift effects as: 
    (A11)
  = Within-Sector Effects  +  Between-Sector Population Shift Effects
In contrast with the standard sectoral decomposition in Equation (A4) as suggested by 
Ravallion and Huppi (1991), there is no interaction term in the Shapley decomposition 
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Decomposing changes in well-being into mean and 
distribution effects 
G
iven a fix well-being threshold, the change in well-being between the initial period t   
and final period t+n for a given group g may be expressed as:
  (A12)
where, m = average well-being and L = the Lorenz curve. Following Shorrocks (1999), 
growth between period t and t + n is denoted by   and redistribution, 
which is due to the shift in the Lorenz curve is given by R = L t + n – L t. The exercise 
becomes that of identifying the contributions of growth, fG, and those of redistribution, 
fR, in the decomposition of changes in any measure of well-being that is additively 
decomposable. 
Adopting the  Î P  class of well-being measures (Foster et al., 1984), aggregate change 
in well-being for group k can now be expressed as:
  (A13)
DPga is now expressed as a function of growth and redistribution. Here again we have 
only two factors, and the possible elimination sequences (permutations) are m! = 2! = 
2, given by {G, R} and {R, G).
It is evident that when dealing with two factors, two extreme situations may arise 
from Equation A13. The first being when growth is absent, that is, G = 0. The change in 
well-being is uniquely explained by redistribution, while holding mean constant.
  (A14)
If it is redistribution that is absent, R = 0. This tells us that changes in well-being are 
solely captured by growth, while conserving initial distribution.
vga(G) = Pga(mt + n,Lt) -Pga(mt,Lt)  (A15)62 r E s E a r c h Pa P E r  207
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